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


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Nietzsche in Outline & Aphorism

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By

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NIETZSCHE

INTRODUCTION

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE was born in 1844 at Röcken, near Lützen in Saxony. While he was still a child his father died of the effects of an accident, and the family was taken to Naumburg on the Saale. As a boy, his sister tells us, he was very pious, and thought much about religious matters. He was also fond of music and poetry. In 1858 he was sent to school at Pforta, where in the following year he first heard the music of Wagner's *Tristan und Isolde*. In 1863 he left Pforta and was admitted as a student at Bonn. In the following year he went to Leipsic, where he read Schopenhauer for the first time. In 1868 he met Wagner, and the two became fast friends till the

fatal year 1876, when the friendship was irretrievably broken. In 1869, Nietzsche was appointed to the Chair of Classical Philology at Basle, and in 1872 his first book appeared, *The Birth of Tragedy*, dedicated to Wagner. Owing to ill health he resigned his Chair in 1880, and spent the remaining years of his life in travel, mostly in Italy.

In 1889 he became seriously ill; a period of severe hallucinatory delirium led on to complete dementia, and he died eleven years later, without recovering his normal consciousness.

His works may be said to have created a new movement in Europe. Of Polish descent, he used often to pride himself on having done for morality what Copernicus did for astronomy and Chopin for music. His ambition was to formulate the problem, not of this or that system of morality, but of morality itself.

In his very first book, *The Birth of Tragedy*, written when he was twenty-eight, he divined the secret of Dionysus, a secret which opened up for him the tragic

conception of the world. Following on this, he applied himself to the criticism of the whole system of European values. In *Inopportune Contemplations*, *Human, all too Human*, *Dawn of the Day*, and *Joyful Science*, he wrote down in aphorism and sentence, the most piercing analysis and most scathing indictment of all that is modern in Europe. As scholar, poet, critic and philosopher, he had demonstrated his capacity for the largest judgments and the profoundest insight of any writer of his day. Into his next book, the most famous of all his works, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, he poured all the positive ideas that had been seething in his brain. Zarathustra, as the Superman, was the main theme of the book, which was written in the Oriental and allegorical style. *Beyond Good and Evil* carried Nietzsche into the furthestmost recesses of his problem. Here he makes a powerful attack on the fundamental conceptions of Western metaphysics, philosophy and psychology. Finally, in *A Genealogy of Morals* and *The Case of Wagner*, he summed up his position on the subject of

morality, and gave it a particular application in a searching analysis of Wagnerism. The book on which he was engaged at his death was to have been his *magnum opus*. It was no less than a complete Revaluation of all Values. In it he set himself to re-value for human ends all the judgments, codes and societies now existing in Europe. But only a section or two, and those chiefly in the form of notes, were finished. In addition to his prose, Nietzsche wrote many poems. They were largely dithyrambic, in honour of his master Dionysus; but he was equally skilful in epigram and lighter verse. His literary style is the greatest Germany has known for decades. He had the art of compressing passion and profundity into a sentence, into a word. Of all modern writers he admired Emerson, whose power of epigram and aphorism was equal or superior to his own. Nietzsche was proud of his style. He avows it as his desire "to create things on which time vainly tries its teeth; | as regards form, | *as regards substance,* | to make an effort after | a

little immortality." "I was," he continues, "never yet modest enough to require less of myself. Aphorism and sentence, in which I, as the foremost among Germans, am master, are the forms of eternity."

In this volume are collected some of Nietzsche's "forms of eternity." Wrested from their setting, the jewels perhaps will not flash so brightly; but, at least, no one can doubt that they are jewels and not common pebbles.

DEFINITIONS

Active gratitude is *kind* revenge.

To be childlike, *i.e.*, not to struggle for one's daily bread, and not to believe that our actions are of final importance.

Corruption is only an injurious term for the autumn of a people.

What constitutes nobility? The divination of values for which scales are not yet invented; sacrifices upon altars dedicated to unknown gods.

Folly, *not* sin.

Sin — the moral interpretation of physiological depression. Redemption, the moral interpretation of physiological recovery.

Faith is the *pons asinorum*.
 . . .

Wide sympathy — one-third indifference, one-third curiosity, one-third sickly irritability.
 . . .

Mankind *en masse* sacrificed in order to ensure the growth of a single stronger species of man—that *would* be progress.
 . . .

Bad conscience—the suffering of man from man himself.
 . . .

Interest—the stimulation of will.
 . . .

Sinfulness in man is not a matter of fact, but only the interpretation of a fact,—of a physiological depression.
 . . .

That youngest of virtues which is called honesty.
 . . .

Rebellion — that is superiority in the slave.
 . . .

What I call the State is where the slow suicide of all is called “life.”
 . . .

Money, the crowbar of power.

Say where is justice to be found, which
is love with seeing eyes.

Where is innocence ? Where will unto
procreation is.

All sun-love is innocence and creative
desire.

This alone is *revenge* : will's abhorrence
of time and its " It was."

Is godliness not just that there are gods,
but no God ?

Bad—that meaneth cowardly.

A people, *i.e.*, many trying.

Human society—is an attempt.

Nobility—consciousness of inexhaust-
ible power. ✓

Pity—an agreeable emotion of the in-
stinct of assimilation in its feeblest aspect.

Sin—a Jewish invention.

" Salvation of the soul " means, in plain

words, "the world revolves around me."

. . . .

Convictions are prisons.

. . . .

Not wishing to see something which one sees, not wishing *so* to see something as one sees it ; that is what I call falsehood.

. . . .

The sense for fact, the last and most valuable of all senses.

. . .

Crusades—superior piracy, that is all.

. . . .

The Renaissance—the transvaluation of Christian values.

. . .

Courage (or immodesty).

. . . .

Tragedy—the dream-world of a Dionysian ecstasy.

. . . .

The thoroughly mob-like movement of resentment, called the Reformation.

. . . .

Egoism is the law of perspective in the domain of sentiment.

Independence — in its weakest dose called “freedom of thought.”

The sum-total of inward emotions, familiar, easily and gracefully aroused, is called a soul.

What else is talent but an older piece of learning?

Formula of my happiness: A Yea, a Nay, a straight line, a *goal*.

Good conscience,—sometimes so like a good digestion as to be mistaken for it.

Look at these superfluous. They steal the works of inventors and the treasures of wise men; their theft they call education. Diseased they are; they vomit bile, and call it newspaper.

To laugh is to be malicious, but with a good conscience.

What is happiness? The feeling that power increases, that a resistance is overcome.

PHILOSOPHY

PROFOUND natures who themselves experience the delight as well as the necessity of co-ordinating and tracing to a single root in themselves all their ideas, theories and opinions, thereby exercising themselves in the spirit of wholeness which is true holiness, will not need to be informed that Nietzsche spent a good deal of his intellectual life in the attempt thus to understand himself. But this attempt was bound to result at length in the search for the nature of reality and for the criterion of the true. In so far as Nietzsche in strict pursuit of a personal problem was finally driven to the examination of these problems, he may be said to have been a metaphysician and a philosopher in the accepted sense. But the qualification must instantly

be made that his vocabulary as well as his material became always more and more concrete and sensuous in proportion as his metaphysic became abstract and speculative. In his case, as to a certain extent in the case of Plato, and still more in the case of Epictetus, the proof of his superior philosophy was always his increased insight into practical life. In all great natures extremes meet; and readers of Nietzsche must beware of taking his materialism grossly or his metaphysic abstractly.

The root problem of all speculative philosophy is the nature of Being. What constitutes reality? What really is? For ages the distinction has been made between the world of Appearance and the world of Reality. On the one hand all our observation and experience demonstrates and necessitates a world of eternal flux. Nothing in the whole world of appearance remains unchanged during a single instant. On the other hand, the mind instinctively predicates a world of Being in which ideas at least remain changeless, stable and eternal.

Thesetwo worlds, the world of our experience and the world of our intellectual necessity, are thus placed in sharp and fundamental antagonism. According to our personal predilections, themselves the expression of deeply rooted instinctive needs, we declare the one world to be real and the other world false. Idealists in general affirm the absolute reality of the world as necessitated by the mind ; materialists in general affirm the absolute reality of the phenomenal world. With a different vocabulary and for other purposes, the writers on religion and on ethics choose one or other of these two worlds as real. To the religionist the phenomenal world is of the earth earthy, while the world of fixed intellectual concepts coloured by emotion is heaven and the other world. For the ethicist, again, this phenomenal world is the world of mingled good and evil, but the intellectual world is the "ideal" world, in which earthly imperfections are fulfilled and made perfections.

Nietzsche as a consistent opponent of every form of absolutism, whether philo-

sophic, religious or scientific, chooses as his real world the world as presented to our consciousness, together with that consciousness itself. For it is plain on reflection that the world of consciousness is in reality not a whit less shifting and fluent than the world of externality. Consciousness itself, in short, is as phenomenal as anything else, and the real world is the world of Becoming.

For Nietzsche there is thus no world of fixed, changeless and eternal truths, no other world of Being, no noumenon behind phenomenon, no thing-in-itself, no abstract reality. This world of everlasting change, in which nothing is but always to be, is the only world.

But while repudiating the absolute value of Idealism, Nietzsche is far from denying its relative value and necessity, or from affirming the absolute value of materialism.

Presented, as we may mythologically conceive that the demiurgic will of the world was presented, with the whole vast chaos of becoming, and self-destined to experience and knowledge of that universal

flux, the world-will as mind, set itself to the mighty task of marking out boundaries and latitudes upon the primeval void and unformed. It is all the same whether we conceive those boundaries to be a self-limitation of the world-will or the demarcations of areas of chaos, for in the end there is no separate world-will and no independent chaos. The process alone is real.

But these lines and bounds upon the hitherto uncreate were no more real than the lines of latitude and longitude upon the earth. Yet they serve the purpose of enabling the mind to examine the stream of becoming, section by section. As the sailor steers his ship by the fixed stars, so the mind of the world created for itself intellectually fixed constellations by means of which directions of movement might be calculated. And if we now say that these fixed lines and constellations correspond to the "ideals" of man, his world of Being, his "true ideal world," it will at once be seen that Nietzsche does not deny either the value or the necessity of

“idealism” and ideals, but only their reality.

But equally Nietzsche denied the absolute reality of materialism; for Matter is no more than one of those imaginary lines and boundaries created by the mind for the purpose of comprehending the process of Becoming. The comparative stability of Matter as contrasted with thought is comparative only. In itself it is no less fluent than everything else. The postulate of Matter is, in fact, a postulate of Idealism, and arises from exactly the same necessity. To affirm therefore the absolute reality of the phenomenal world alone is no less absurd than to affirm the absolute reality of a noumenal world. There is no absolute world either of matter or of idea. There is no fixed being either sensuous or ethereal. Consequently, materialism is as unphilosophic as idealism.

But what remains, we may ask, when we have denied the absolute reality of the worlds hitherto conceived? the process of Becoming, Nietzsche replies. That process alone is real. Action is all. The world

is no more than an eternal energy, an everlasting activity, a perpetual becoming. And if we ask further what is the nature of that energy, its being and source, Nietzsche replies, It is Will. Will as the final reality, the only reality ; Will as eternally engaged in its own natural task of ceaseless action ; Will as the fountain and container of all that is ; such is Nietzsche's conception of reality.

And in his philosophic adventuring he foresees a great task for the men of the future. Rationalists have constructed their hierarchy of values by the aid of reason, giving to things a value proportionate to their reason ; materialists have constructed their hierarchy in which things mount the ladder of reality in proportion to their materiality ; religionists, æsthetes, ethicists and the rest have valued things according to their religious, æsthetic or ethical values. Let us one day, asks Nietzsche, re-value the world according to the scale of will. For since in ourselves will is that which alone makes us real, then will alone makes the reality of all things ; and all things are to be valued in proportion as they mani-

fest will. To the eye of Nietzsche the whole world of manifestation is the stage upon which a universal Will plays in myriad forms. The forms, the appearances, the colours, the disposition of the players, all are alike unreal. What alone is real is the Will that moves in various degrees of power in and through all the various players, be they stones or men.

But of the two views of the world, the world as Being and the world as Appearance, it is certain that philosophically at least the former is the more seductive. Nowhere, as religious moralists declare with pride, can a tribe be found so "degraded" as to be without some conception of God. Nowhere, that is, can men be found to whom the danger of belief in absolute idealism is not greater than the danger of belief in absolute materialism. Man is, in short, pre-eminently the idealising animal. In him the world-will as mind begins and continues its self-appointed task of measuring the foundations of the formless deep. Consequently, for him the greatest danger will always be the possession of his noblest

faculty, the faculty of reason. The mind, says an old Hindu treatise, is the slayer of the real.

And since generally it is the philosophers who have first become conscious of the purpose of the world-will, it is amongst philosophers that the errors will be most numerous ; for they, being as yet human, all too-human, are incapable of clearly discriminating, as we may suppose the world-will itself discriminates, between means and end. Almost all philosophers have been, in fact, confirmed idealists, believing in the absolute reality of that world of Being which in truth was merely a necessary figment of their intellectual imagination. Philosophers have almost invariably become the authors of "another world" in some form or other.

Hence it was predominantly necessary in Nietzsche's view to counteract this inveterate tendency of minds of the philosophic order. Constituting as they did the supremely powerful caste of mind, being by nature the most profound and the most richly endowed with will, they became by

that very power as dangerous as they were necessary. Like Plato's Republic, which employed philosophers because it must and yet ran the peril of being destroyed by them, the world-will has created for itself this supremely conscious type of creature only to find its own purposes thereby imperilled.

For if the process of Becoming is alone real, and Reality is that which acts, then the substitution of an ideal, fixed, changeless world of Being is from the standpoint of the world-will a fatal heresy. And since the philosopher is also the leader of men, he not only himself goes astray when he pursues his "ideals," but the rest of men go astray with him.

This misguided attempt on the part of philosophers to discover reality where in fact there is no reality is named by Nietzsche *Nihilism*; and the signs of *Nihilism* are apparent, he says, everywhere in Europe. No matter where the mind rests, whether on religion, art, science, ethics, or politics, the trail of that philosophic heresy is over them all. Everywhere men believe in the

reality of an absolute world of ideals. In religion it is heaven, in art it is beauty, in science it is truth, in ethics it is the ideal, in politics it is the greatest good of the greatest number, in life it is peace. But there is no heaven, no beauty, no truth, no "ideal," no happiness, no peace. These are simply ideas of the mind, created as guides. They belong to the imaginary world, and were made for man. To pursue them as ends is to neglect them as means, and also to reduce man to a position of vassalage. Instead of ideals in the proper sense, serving as banners under which the struggle of the world-will may proceed to diviner heights, they become "idols," before which men prostrate themselves in desire for the cessation of life. Every desire for these abstract things is, in truth, a desire contrary to life; for it is not in the nature of life to fulfil ideals, and the desire to have them fulfilled, or, rather, the conviction that they will one day be fulfilled, assumes the existence of a will that has lost its way and no longer desires life.

But such a misdirection and wandering

of the will of man involves a much more serious loss of vital instincts. That the instincts should need to be combated is in itself the proof of decadence. Nietzsche saw in this European idealism, with its aspirations towards the "other world" a great movement of decadence in the European will. But since decadence goes hand in hand with renaissance, it was, he conceived, the business of a new race of philosophers to promulgate anew the conception of life as eternal Becoming.

In its great mythologic form, this process of becoming was revealed and renewed in the mysteries of Dionysus. Nietzsche proclaimed himself, therefore, the disciple and initiate of Dionysus, the initiator. As Dionysus had reawakened a slumbering Greece, so he would reawaken a slumbering Europe. The decadence must run its course, but at least it might be checked. The movement of renewal might be begun.

But it was necessary to enlist in the service of Dionysus first philosophers, then artists. On the former would fall the task of reaffirming in the most intellectual cir-

cles the noble doctrines of the eternal drama of life. They must be men who saw, felt and realised in themselves the play of the world-will ; consequently, men of supremely powerful will and brain ; men in whose minds the drama of the world was already being enacted ; consequently, men of rich and tragical experience. Materialists were under too gross an illusion, being slaves to a creation of their minds. Rationalists were no less useless, since they were slaves to their minds. As for idealists, they were the enemy itself ; for was not Dionysus being forsaken for " another world " ?

No, what was needed was a type of mind that felt the struggle, and yet deliberately willed that it might increase. Far from feebly sighing for a world of fixed truths and ideals, so easy to handle, these new philosophers would turn their backs upon every form of absolutism, and will only that the stage of the visible, perceptible and emotional world should be enlarged to contain more tragic, more terrible protagonists.

And for philosophers who in the various

spheres of human things should dare to will an increase of the very elements that men most feared, there must also be great artists who should cast the glamour of attraction over the new "ideals." Thus might Europe be led little by little to renew its youth, and to cast off the tyranny of idealism, and set itself once more to the task of becoming what its own nature destined for it.

PHILOSOPHERS AND PHILOSOPHY

Every great philosophy is finally a confession, an involuntary memoir.

Where the tree of knowledge is, there always is paradise.

A philosopher—is a man who constantly tries, sees, suspects, hopes, dreams of extraordinary things—who is struck by his own thoughts as if they came from without.

They are the highest philosophers who are capable of *golden* laughter.

Convictions are more dangerous enemies to truth than lies.

I am weary of my wisdom. . . . I would

fain grant and distribute until the wise among men could once more enjoy their folly, and the poor once more their riches.

. . .

[Brave, unconcerned, scornful, violent—thus wisdom would have us be ; she is a woman and ever loveth the warrior only.

. . .

All unuttered truths become poisonous.

. . .

Thoughts which come on dove's feet rule the world.

. . .

For the sake of folly, wisdom is mixed with all things.

. . .

[Where mine honesty ceaseth, I am blind and will be blind. But where I intend to know, I will also be honest, *i.e.*, hard, severe, narrow, cruel, inexorable.

. . .

The doer alone learneth.

. . .

[The majority of men are wanting in intellectual conscientiousness.

. . .

A married philosopher is a figure of comedy.

Asceticism for the philosopher—an optimum of the conditions of highest and keenest spirituality.

. . .

All stage-players of the spirit have ever found solitude unbearable.

. . .

It characterises the philosopher that he avoids three showy and noisy things—glory, princes and women; whereby it is not meant to be said, however, that they should not come to him.

. . .

For the thinker success and failure are only responses.]

. . .

I praise all kinds of scepticism which permit me to reply: "Let us test it."

. . .

In the last analysis the "truths" of man are only irrefutable errors.

. . .

Only when man shall know all things shall he know himself; for things are only the frontiers of man.

. . .

Only fanaticism is possible for phlegmatic natures.]

[We thinkers must first establish the relish of all things, and, if necessary, decree it. Practical people would even undervalue their practical life if we were to slight it.

. . . .
We have not the right to be *single* in any one respect; we must neither err singly nor singly hit upon truth.

[In order to make a thing stay, it must be burned into memory.

. . . .
In all things one thing is impossible—reasonableness.

. . . .
Wisdom sets bounds even to knowledge.

[There is no “being” behind doing, acting, becoming. The “doer” is merely a fictitious addition to the doing; the doing is all.

. . . .
This blissful security I found in all things; they rather like to *dance* with chance’s feet.

L I F E

SCHOPENHAUER had traced the sources of life beyond the reason to the Will. 'The Will, he said, is the life. But it was characteristic of his doctrines that he should lay the greatest stress upon the self-preservative aspect of the Will. The Will to Live is, in fact, the Schopenhauerian phrase of discovery. Nietzsche accepted Schopenhauer's conception of the Will as the essence of life, but substituted, or rather added, the significant definition: Life is the Will to Power.

Looking out upon the spectacle of living things (for, in reality, Life means no more than the sum total of living things), Nietzsche beheld them struggling instinctively not merely to maintain themselves, but to increase and extend their power. Far from

being satisfied with simple self-maintenance, all living things appear to desire more. So soon as favourable conditions arose, a given species began to multiply and spread as if desiring to universalise itself. This was certainly the case in the vegetable and animal worlds, though Darwin had failed to observe the tendency. And Nietzsche believed that the same conception held good in the case of man.

For secretly or avowedly each man desires at bottom to establish an autocracy, whether by means of ideas or personality or action, whether contemporaneously or posthumously. So inveterate is this tyrannical universalising will in him, that the will to preserve himself is often completely forgotten. Were Life no more than the Will to Live, we should find it difficult to account for acts of self-sacrifice and self-abandonment. Where could be the will that could run counter to and overcome the only will in life?

As a supremely active nature, Nietzsche was conscious in himself of a will that could not be satisfied merely with prolongation of

life. Over and over again he felt within himself longings and desires which no bare continuity of life could fulfil, longings and desires which in some respects were in open conflict with the will to live, and indeed imperilled life itself. And this surplus of will in himself and others he named the Will to Power, because its longing was for more life and not merely for continued life, for more power and not merely for maintenance of present power, for progress and not merely for continuity.

The relation to each other of these two wills in man, the Will to Live and the Will to Power, formed a considerable part of Nietzsche's speculative problem. For in their struggles within himself he saw in small the struggles of the drama of the world. If in himself, who was but a fragment of the world-will, there was eternal conflict between his will to maintain his life, and his will to imperil it and even throw it away for an idea, then perhaps the same conflict might be beheld at large in the affairs of the world.

In the very largest sense life was, he con-

ceived, an eternal process of Becoming. But what, he asked, maintained the process? On the supposition that the Will to Live is the only will, the process of Becoming might conceivably come to an end, and that Platonic dream of an Endymion world be realised. To account not merely for the continued existence of the panorama of life, but for the continued ascent of life, did not that necessitate another kind of will, namely, the will to surpass, the will to increased power?

If the wheel of life were itself the will to live, the will to power was its motive force. Only by the activity of that surplus could the process be heightened and intensified.

As ever, Nietzsche instantly began to verify his speculations by observation of living things, and particularly of men. In human societies he saw the numerous institutions, regulations and laws created and maintained. For what purpose? Plainly, they were designed to maintain life. Just to the extent that they guarded men, protected them against enemies without and enemies within, they served the purpose of

the will to live. But who were those enemies within and those enemies without that threatened the safety of the members of the society? No other than powerful individuals and powerful foreign communities in whom life was strong enough to afford a surplus employed in aggression. In short, all human institutions owed their existence primarily to the Will to Live, but secondarily as a defence against the Will to Power. *could this be one enemy?*

But the relationship between these two wills is not merely one of conflict, but also one of mutual necessity. Each demands that the other should exist. For, on the one hand, what possible meaning or significance could life have were it not perpetually unfolding itself? The monotonous repetition of a single type of life would be a monstrous farce without meaning and without interest. The will to live is itself unjustified except by that other will to constantly progress. Only by "progress," by ever new creation, is life made tolerable. On the other hand, the will to surpass is itself conditioned by the will to live. Without the will

to live, the will to power is impossible, non-existent.

Yet necessary as each is to the other, their relationship is mutually agonistic. Perpetual struggle of living things to maintain themselves against the will in themselves to spend themselves ; the tragedy of life ; Dionysus and Apollo in eternal conflict.

But it was plain that individuals varied together with the societies to which they belonged, and were predominantly Apol-
lan or Dionysian. Necessary as each was to the other, it was conceivable that individuals and communities and races might attempt to divorce them. Even though the will to power could not exist apart from the will to live, being its surplus and excess, yet perhaps the will to live might endeavour to maintain itself without the will to power.

But this could only happen among individuals in whom life was already deficient and declining. Amongst them the life-force was so feeble as to afford no surplus, no overflow. And such individuals or societies would create for themselves institutions

designed solely to preserve the already diminished life. That, in short, was Nietzsche's view of the modern European and modern European institutions. With few exceptions, they were decadent and reflected a decadent life. Their avowed object was the preservation of men. That preservation they called by the fine names of progress, culture, evolution, what not! But the end was not the surpassing of men, but simply human comfort. They wished to die in peace.

If, however, this decadence of the life-force was well-nigh universal in Europe, were there not signs of an approaching ascent? Life being by its very nature both the will to live and the will to power, it was not possible that the will to power should slumber for ever.

Amongst the masses of men arranged now in hierarchies without any value, there were still here and there powerful individuals, in whom the surplus of life existed. Against the benumbing effects of preservative institutions such men were driven to actions which society regarded

as criminal, immoral, unprincipled. So far such individuals were rare, yet even so they constituted the saving salt of life. For institutions of all kinds had no meaning except as a defence, and the extinction of its enemies reduced the institution to absurdity.

But if Europe was ever again to mount the scale of life, it was necessary that such men should be encouraged, and institutions for their culture be created. The tragical nature of life demanded that this should be so. There was need of a propaganda amongst these few of the Dionysian mysteries. They should learn to realise the nature of life, realise their responsibility not for life's continuance, but for life's surpassing. On them depended the pace of life's becoming.

L I F E

No, life has not deceived me. I find it on the contrary year by year more rich, more desirable, and more mysterious — ever since the day there came to me the great liberator, the thought that life might be an experiment for the seeker after knowledge; not a duty, not a fatality, not a sham and a fraud. "Life as a means to knowledge" with this principle in one's heart one can — not only live bravely, but with joy and laughter.

The value of life itself cannot be estimated.

To *have* to combat instincts—that is the formula for decadence : so long as life *ascends* happiness is identical with instinct.

Life I regard as instinct for growth, for

continuance, for accumulation of forces, for *power*; where the will to power is wanting there is decline.

. . .

The existence of the world can be justified only as an æsthetic phenomenon.

. . .

Life is something essentially immoral.

. . .

We care at bottom but for this—*to bring something home*.

. . .

To be just is always a *positive* conduct.

. . .

In order that a sanctuary may be erected, a sanctuary must be broken down.

. . .

Hang up no more withered wreaths in the sanctuary of life.

. . .

A thousand paths there are which have never yet been walked, a thousand healths and hidden islands of life.

. . .

All living things are things that obey.

. . .

Life is whatever must surpass itself.

. . .

Many things are valued higher by living things than life itself.

Life is a constant struggle against that which wants to die; cruelty and implacableness against the tendencies of decay.

Nothing is of value except the degree of power.

Life is so hard to bear? Do not pretend to be so frail.

Spirit is that life which itself cutteth into life.

In the end one experienceth nothing but oneself.

Courage saith, "Was *that* life? Up! Once more!"

The world — not riddle enough to frighten away human love; not solution enough to put to sleep human wisdom.

The secret of a joyful life is to live dangerously.

Wherever I found living matter there I found will unto power.

I call an animal, a species, an individual

depraved and decadent when it loses its instincts, when it selects, when it *prefers* what is injurious to it.

. . .
Nothing is more dangerous than to desire something contrary to life.

. . .
Every complaint is an accusation, every joy is praise.

MAN AND WOMAN

NIETZSCHE's conception of the real nature of Man is difficult to grasp, so long as we remain bound by what the Hindu philosophers name the heresy of separateness. In one sense it is true that humanity consists of so many millions of separated beings, each defined by his own skin and self-contained. But that view is the view of naïve realism which takes matter for a final reality. In Nietzsche's view, as we have seen, the very final reality is Will, and since this manifests equally and indifferently in all forms, and in fact has created for its own diversion the very meaning and appearance of form, it is the Will that we must regard as the essence of humanity.

From the standpoint of the universal Will all forms are no more than bubbles on

the surface of its becoming; or, to adopt the consistent image of tragedy, are no more than the successive characterisations of the world-will in the great drama of its unfoldment. Man is thus not an end in himself, nor is the universe designed for his happiness or perfection. Man is only the noblest protagonist in the æsthetic spectacle of tragic existence. That he as individual is generally incapable of appreciating the spectacle of himself, or, again, that he should believe himself the end and crown of existence are errors natural enough in the early stages of self-consciousness. But Nietzsche looked forward to the creation of intelligent beings who while playing their part in the drama should at the same time appreciate the spectacle. Thus they would share in the very life of Life, and become, in fact, the creators of the tragedy they beheld. Men at the present stage are, however, human, all too human for such a view. The very suggestion of tragedy appals them. They desire to have done with pain and with struggle, both of which are essential to tragedy. They look forward patheti-

cally to a day of deliverance and to a Saviour, as if praying that the tragic cup might be taken away. But all this, Nietzsche affirmed, is only the sign of decadence. For if the process of Becoming is eternal, then there is no final escape from the spectacle of its unfolding. Pain must be and tragedy must be, if the Will to Power operates by means of which the wheel of Becoming is kept rolling. And since this Will to Power is inherent in the very nature of Life itself, the pain and the tragedy must either be openly accepted as necessary elements in the drama, or concealed from the consciousness by means of soporifics and anodynes. It is, then, as a mere section and moment in the eternal Becoming that Man as a species must be regarded. Man is a bridge and not a goal, a becoming and not a being. As a being and an end in himself, man is contemptible. His value is in his pregnancy. Of all creatures Man is the most promising, just because of all creatures he is the most adventurous, experimental and self-torturing. All the tragical history of man would be nothing better than a meaning-

less comedy were it not that such a history can be regarded as the pre-natal condition of a superior and justifying species. Man is pre-eminently the pregnant animal, supremely interesting just on that account, and hence supremely significant as the present protagonist of the world-will.

It needs little observation to verify man's present fragmentary nature. Of all the men that have lived, can we name a single one in whom the spirit of all humanity has dwelt? Even of the Prophet of Nazareth it was possible for so devout a man as Carlyle to say with regret: "There is no Falstaff in Him." And what of our Cæsars and Napoleons, our Buddhas and our Platos, our sages, saints, prophets and martyrs? Not one of them has been the "synthetic man," the gatherer and revealer of all the powers of humanity.

Yet behind each individual and incarnated in each to a greater or lesser degree there is the Great Reason, the Mighty Lord, the Self. He or It—for it is the Man or Humanity—stands below and above and around all the apparently isolated frag-

ments of itself. Its great continent, appearing to us as an archipelago, is the home and source and being of all our separated lives. Through and behind our insular consciousness, our fragmentary reason, our petty self and "Me," plays this world consciousness; and in its hands is the control of all the forces which we as fragments cannot yet consciously employ. Call that cosmic life the life of instinct, impulse, inspiration — what you will — the fact remains that in comparison with our reasoned, controlled and conscious life our instinctual life is infinitely greater, wiser and more profound. It is in unconsciousness that all mastery resides. All that is conscious is imperfect, fallible and human.

Met by such a view of man and his relations with the spirit of Humanity, the individual may fall into despair. Despair on account of man was indeed Nietzsche's usual attitude. With an almost maternal eye he looked upon the struggling race of men and doubted if they would be equal to the great task set before them. It was quite possible to contemplate the super-

session of man by a superior type of being, but as human himself Nietzsche may be supposed to have had the natural desire to see his own species triumphant in the drama. But the superior race was not to be created merely by wishing, nor by dangling ideals before the present race. With all his imperfections actual man was infinitely superior to any ideal man that had ever been conceived.

H A being compounded of all the various ideals of men would be a monster and a warning,—fortunately, also, an impossibility. For in the process of Becoming the successive phases are determined by a choice among potentialities; and this choice confined to actually existing powers in man must be voluntarily taken. Thus it is true that there are many things that man may be; but there are also many things that man can never become. And among the things that man cannot become are all the “ideals” of men as described by the religious and ethical reformers. Man, in short, can become only what he already is; he can never become what he is not.

Amongst individuals at any moment there exist differences of value which on the great scale constitute the hierarchy of humanity. All beings are of value, but the greatest value belongs to those in whom the world-will is incarnated in the highest degree. In plain words, the most valuable men in the world are the men of the greatest power; for to them the highest hopes of the race have been entrusted. But readers of Nietzsche are warned against falling into the vulgar error of confusing vital strength with violence. Nowhere is Nietzsche to be taken less grossly than in his conception of power. The men of power in his eyes are not the men of sinew and brawn, but men in whom the power of mastery over both themselves and others is greatest. For it is to be observed that the surplus of will that Nietzsche calls spirit cuts as deeply into its own source as into the lives of others. All tragic heroes are self-torturers no less than torturers. It is by power over themselves that they demonstrate their right to power over others. Other power is illegitimately held, and is a mere

abortion and simulacrum of power. Again, it is in the will of such men to surpass themselves that their virtue resides. Because they are the finest types of the race their own self-surpassing is a victory for the race as a whole. When Socrates crowned a noble life with a still more noble death, it was not merely the dignity of Socrates that was raised, but the dignity of man. Such men indeed give significance and self-respect to humanity. Terrible as their lives may appear (as instance the lives of Cæsar Borgia, Napoleon, Cromwell) they nevertheless impress the race with a sense of self-respect which in itself, individually and racially, is of the very highest value. Respect for man is indeed the indispensable condition of well-being and well-doing; and Nietzsche constantly emphasises the undoubted fact that a sense of self-respect can only be obtained by the witnessing of power. To accomplish its task, humanity must win confidence in itself; and this confidence is fed and nourished by the spectacle of its most powerful individuals, both good and bad.

The relations of the sexes to each other and to the world-will were never thoroughly investigated by Nietzsche; or, if they were, he preferred to leave his results in sentences scattered here and there. On the whole, he seems to have regarded Woman as predominantly the idealist, and Man as predominantly the realist. But in this attitude he was by no means constant. As the experimenting fringe and advanceguard of the world-will, he certainly looked upon man as pre-eminently the warrior and the type of the will to power. Correspondingly, woman was the principle of conservation and the will to live. Yet, as has been said, the will to live is no more than the ground and condition of the will to power; and as representing these, woman is the ground and condition of man. It is in man that woman finds her own meaning and purpose, — a meaning and purpose which she could not discover without him. For while man is a means to the world-will's purpose, woman is a means to man.

This, however, need not be taken in too strict a sense; for few beings are at present

wholly male or wholly female. The differentiation of the sexes is still far from being complete. Again, it would reduce the whole conception to absurdity to place individual over against individual, and to subordinate one to the other. In the case of the whole man, the whole woman quite naturally assumes a place of means to his means. She willingly sacrifices herself to him who sacrifices himself; not, be it observed, to him who sacrifices himself to her; for she is not the end for which he exists; but to him who sacrifices himself for the purposes of the world-will. In this sense, woman is the great critic on behalf of the world-will. It is she who awards blame or praise to men for their exertions in the great drama; and her blame and praise are all the more effective because they are accompanied by the rewards or punishments of continuity of the type.

All this, of course, is in the large sense; but societies have sought out many inventions whereby this natural economy of the sexes has been falsified and prevented. The institution of marriage, for example,

while in many respects noble and dignified, is in many more respects ignoble and fatal to the race. As an institution, marriage has doubtless had its value, but in the event of humanity becoming conscious of a purpose, marriage along with other institutions must be revalued. At the end of it all, the question to be asked of every institution is whether it makes for the creation of a superior type. Since such creation is the will of becoming, which is the essence of life, all institutions which threaten to thwart it are doomed to pass away.

MAN AND WOMAN

Behind thy thoughts and feelings standeth a mighty lord, an unknown wise man, whose name is Self.

The creative body created for itself the spirit to be the hand of its will.

Where the State ceaseth there beginneth that man who is not superfluous; there beginneth the song of the necessary.

Woman is not yet capable of friendship; she knoweth love only.

But say, ye men, which of you is capable of friendship? As much as ye give unto your friend, I will give unto mine enemy, and will not become poorer thereby.

Two things are wanted by the true man, —danger and play.

Man shall be educated for war, and woman for the recreation of the warrior. Everything else is folly.

. . .
Every man fit for warfare, every woman fit for children, both fit for dancing with head and legs.

. . .
Give us a term and a small marriage that we may see whether we are fit for the great marriage.

. . .
There is no harder lot in all human fate than when the powerful of the earth are not at the same time the first men. There everything becometh false and warped and monstrous.

. . .
Ye are only bridges.

. . .
That ye despaired, therein is much to honour.

. . .
Ye suffer from yourselves, ye have never yet suffered *from man*.

. . .
And if ye have failed in great things, are ye for that reason yourselves a failure?

To vulgar natures all noble and generous sentiments appear extravagant, fanciful, absurd, unreasonable.

Man is more childlike than woman.

Thou goest to women? Remember thy whip!

Marriage: this I call the will of two to create that one which is more than they who created it.

I wish the earth would tremble in convulsions whenever a saint and a goose couple.

The perceiving one walketh among men as among animals—the animals with red cheeks.

Within *me* justice saith: Men are not equal; neither shall they become so.

Sterile ye are; *therefore* faith is lacking.

Verily, I walk among men as among the fragments and limbs of men; fragments and limbs and dismal accidents, but no men!

Only he who is enough of a man will *save the woman* in woman.

Not to be able to take seriously for a long time an enemy, or a misfortune, or even one's own misdeeds—is the characteristic of strong and full natures.

All instincts which do not discharge themselves outwards will receive an inward direction—this is what I call the internalisation of man.

What bestiality of idea . . . if hindered from being a beast of action !

Man is a something that shall be surpassed. What have ye done to surpass him?

He who is the wisest among you is but a discord and hybrid of plant and ghost.

Not your sin, your moderation crieth unto heaven.

What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal.

You write on the wall the terrible

wrongs of man in order to awaken yourself to action. For this active pleasure of yours you demand that wrongs should exist. Pardon me, my friends, I have dared to write on the wall,—*my happiness!*

. . .

To give style to character one thing only is necessary—a simple, continuous taste.

. . .

Whenever the arbitrating power falls into the hands of the masses, genuineness becomes superfluous, disadvantageous and a drawback.

. . .

How much more worthy is actual man compared with any *ideal* man whatever.

. . .

Marriage is a splendid lie; it affirms the eternity of a passion which experience declares to be of all passions the most transient.

. . .

The sheer blind chance of marriage makes every reasonable and great human career impossible.

. . .

The people who attach most importance to scrupulous conscientiousness are

they who are conscious of many mean feelings.

. . .

Neither necessity nor desire, nay, the love of power is the demon of mankind.

. . .

It is the most sensual men who have to shun women and torture their bodies.

. . .

We may estimate our forces, but not our force.

. . .

The dying person has probably lost in life things more important than he is about to lose by death.

. . .

As long as genius dwells within us we are bold, nay, reckless of life, health and honour.

. . .

The Yes hidden in you is much stronger than all the Noes and all the Perhaps, of which you are ill.

. . .

Man has lost dignity in his own eyes.

. . .

We have realised the impossibility of Free-will, but we have lost the taste for necessity.

A marriage is worth exactly what the two contracting parties are worth.

. . .
A man who suffers has not yet won the *right* to pessimism.

. . .
The Me is only an interpretation of physiological complexities, resolved by the most powerful tendency.

. . .
The same passions have different origins in man and in woman.

A R T

THE will being the final reality, all that operates directly on the will is vital in the next highest degree, and exists for the sake of the will. Of all such means to life Art is the greatest, because in the economy of the world-will it is Art which perpetually creates new objects of attraction and desire. Art is the arch-seducer to life.

But Art must be taken in its very widest sense, as the element of attractiveness in all things. Wherever attraction exists, calling out of the individual that differentiated current of his world-will named by man desire, there is Art. In the ensemble of the world-will as man, however, this magic power of ever-renewed attraction is manifested to a greater degree in artists,

who, from this standpoint, are seduction incarnate.

But for the attraction of things, focussed and reinforced by artists, the very process of becoming would cease. Becoming, in fact, is maintained only by desire, which, in turn, is engendered or evoked by beauty. Hence Art or the creation of objects of desire is essential to the continuity of the world-process. Because, however, Art is the great seducer to life it may be also the great seducer to death. Casting the magic glamour of attraction over things, the artist may as easily endow with the power of evoking desire things which lie in the past stages of becoming as things which lie in the phases of future becoming. Again, Art may seduce men from life altogether, may persuade them to follow after phantoms that lead to nowhere and nothing.

Just on this account Art is both the most powerful for and the most powerful against life; and the artist may be saviour or traitor to the race.

Nietzsche distinguishes the two types of Art in several ways. Taking as his test of

value the value to man, he conceives of beauty as that which promises man more life. The highest beauty belongs to those beings which attract most powerfully and fulfil most completely their promise of life. The world, he appears to say, is a desert scattered with oases and with mirages, both the product of the artist's creative imaginations. The greatest beauty is the beauty of the oasis which not only attracts but justifies to man its attraction. The dangerous beauty is the mirage which attracts and in the end betrays.

These two forms or types—for both are constant—Nietzsche named sometimes according to one classification and sometimes according to another. All art he says in one place, is either ascendant or decadent, either leads the will upwards to increase and power, or downwards to decrease and feebleness. Whatever proves to stimulate and enlarge the spirit of man, that excess and surplus of will over and above the will to live, thereby leads to a heightening and intensifying of the process of becoming ; for, as has been seen, Nietzsche con-

ceived the process of becoming to be dependent on the excess and surplus of the will. Hence Ascendant art is that which stimulates this surplus, and thereby intensifies the life-drama. Decadent art, on the other hand, is that which diminishes the excess and surplus, either by directly paralysing its virility and desire, or by leading it to waste itself in the void upon ideals. For ideals, being merely intellectual counters and mnemonic and metric devices, have no reality of their own, that is, no will ; yet a fictitious mirage-like reality and attractiveness may be given them by the glamour of art ; and, thus endowed, they become sirens, seducing man to his doom. Paralysis of the will is comparable to sleep, and art as anodyne and sedative belongs to the decadent order.

But this classification was too "objective" to satisfy Nietzsche very long ; and we find him adopting another view based on the nature of the artist himself. The question, he says, is always : Out of what did the artist produce this work, out of excess and superabundance of life,

or out of a defect of life? Paraphrasing the question, did the artist need to create thus in order to express himself; or did he desire to create thus in order to satisfy himself? Was it a need to give, or a need to obtain? Was the artist rich enough to dispense life as a largesse; or so poor that he needed to beg alms of himself?

But this opens up another view. All noble art, with all noble religion, Nietzsche says, breathes gratitude for life; all ignoble, decadent and vacuous art breathes the atmosphere of the chambers of sleep and death. Great art is a song of praise, an overflowing of life back to its source, a dithyramb of thanksgiving and gratitude. Decadent art is, at bottom, a criticism and a complaint; its root is resentment; it turns wearily from life, and would fain lay down the burden of living. In the personal natures of artists this is expressed by Nietzsche in the classification of active or reactive men. Active men are those in whom the will is abundant enough to initiate activity and to become a "self-rolling wheel." In reactive men, the will

is either defective or dormant. It requires stimulus from without to stir it into action. The question of the artist may therefore be stated in these terms : Is he an active nature or a reactive nature ? Is his vitality sufficient to move by its own surplus ; or did it require an external stimulus ? In short, was it an inner necessity implying an excess of power, or merely a desire implying a defect of power, that became incarnate in the work of art ?

But these modes of appreciation may be employed each as a check upon the other. It is difficult sometimes to tell from the art work itself whether excess or defect of will in the artist was creative ; and in such doubt his personal psychology may be of value. Again, it often happens that nothing is known of the personality of the artist, and then we are left entirely to his work. Yet the fact remains that the artist and his work are of the same fundamental nature. Ex-
cess of life in him endows his work with
the power of stimulating the same excess in the wills of others ; for life is alone the initiator of life, as flame is of flame.

Defect in him inevitably incarnates as defect in his work, and his work then becomes a danger to life, a kind of vampire and incarnate vortex of hunger and thirst.

This decadent art must not, however, be identified with the ugly or the terrifying. On the contrary its very attractiveness constitutes its danger. The ugly may be sublime and vitalising by offering, as it were, a challenge to the will of man. In the most terrifying forms of Greek tragedy, for example, the effect on the well-constituted mind is a stimulus. The will is braced and intensified by the spectacle of a worthy enemy. Not only in art, but in life the ugly, the terrifying and the "evil" have their place in the economy of things, being great in proportion as they arouse and nerve the will to action. Decadent art, on the contrary, unnerves and devitalises the will, and may be pretty, as noble art never is.

In the sense that Art is thus the great stimulus to life, the enchanter who unfolds or creates alluring vistas, and so seduces the will to the task of the eternal becoming,

Art is moral. But the morality is not that of any creed or Sinaitic tablets or transient mode of life, but of life itself. Art for Art's sake means in effect, says Nietzsche, no more than "Devil take morality." But while properly repudiating any alliance with temporary systems of morality, Art regarded as an end in itself is no less idealistic, absolute and impossible. Nothing but the process of Becoming exists for its own sake, and Art and everything else are means to that great end, and part of the general economy of the world-will.

Nietzsche's main view emerges clearly enough in this form: "Ecstasy as both cause and effect of all great Art." Ecstasy being precisely that consciousness of surplus and excess of will, creating the Will to Power, all great art issues from that surplus and in turn plays upon and evokes that surplus in others. It is thus in the closest alliance with the process of Becoming; is, in short, the mode by which that process is created, preserved—or destroyed.

A R T

Beauty in art implies the imitation of all that is happy.

. . . .

We have attained mastery when we neither mistake nor hesitate in the achievement.

. . . .

Oh that the poets would again be such as they were wont to be, seers foretelling us something of our possible future !

. . . .

Poor artist of to-day ! with an audience of greedy, insatiable, uncurbed, loathsome, harassed spirits, and compelled to be half-priest, half-alienist.

. . . .

Formerly a good musician was almost sure to become a good man for the sake of his art.

In art the grand style is not pretty.

Gracefulness is part of the generosity
of the magnanimous.

When power becometh gracious and
steppeth down into visibleness—beauty I
call such stepping down.

Where is beauty? Where I am *com-
pelled to will* with all my will.

Perfect things teach hope.

I wish to learn more and more to con-
sider as beauty what is necessary in
things. . . . I do not wish to war with
ugliness. Let turning away be my only
negation.

Artist—a continual creator; among men,
a mother in the superior sense . . . but
nobody knows so little about a child as its
parents.

What is good is easy; everything
divine runs with light feet,—the first pro-
position of my *Æsthetics*.

Has it been noticed that music *makes* the spirit free? All that is good makes me productive. . . . I have no other proof of what is good.

. . . .

Wagnerism—the advent of the stage-player in music.

. . . .

Decadence art demands Salvation; beautiful and great art expresses Gratitude.

. . . .

Æsthetics is certainly nothing but applied Physiology.

. . . .

The theatre—the art of the masses par excellence.

. . . .

Something on which a *noble* artist must never operate,—the masses! the immature! the used-up! the morbid! the idiots!

. . . .

All true, all original music is a swan's song.

. . . .

To the existence of art, a preliminary psychological condition is necessary, namely, ecstasy.

In art man enjoys himself as perfection.

Nothing is beautiful, except man ; nothing is ugly, except *degenerating* man.

Art is the great stimulus to life.

All excellence is inheritance ; we have first to persuade the body.

Nothing is more corruptible than an artist.

The sublime is the mantle of the ugly.

We must learn from artists to see things in the right way ; and yet we must be more wise than they. For we will to be the poets of our life, and that above all in the smallest daily things.

Regarding all æsthetic values I make use now of this capital distinction : Is it defect or abundance of life which has become creative ?

At the sound of music every lover thinks, " It speaks of me, it speaks in my stead, it knows everything."

Nothing is so much dreaded by artists, poets and authors as that eye which sees their minor deceptions, detects when they were about to sell little for much, or tried to exalt without being themselves exalted.

. . .
The great Art inspires; but it does not instruct : Art glorifies.

. . .
Artist : the great memoir maker : the great peacock of existence.

MORALITY

WE have seen that a surplus of will over and above that necessary to maintain life is named by Nietzsche the Will to Power. In every community, however, the majority of individuals have no such surplus. The whole of their energy is consumed in the endeavour to maintain themselves. But in a few individuals, specially endowed and happily constituted, the will is sufficient to afford a surplus, by means of which such individuals are distinguished from the rest of men.

Since in Nietzsche's philosophic view the entire process of Becoming, its intensification and "progress" depend wholly on the existence and activity of this surplus, those gifted individuals in whom the surplus is incarnated constitute a privileged

and superior type. They are the redeemers, saviours, and creators of the world, the pioneers of the race and the advance guard of life itself. In comparison with them the rest of men are infinitely less valuable. What matters it to the world-will whether men are preserved, so long as man is surpassed? And the surpassing of man is dependent upon those few individuals in whom superabundance of will manifesting as instinct towards power exists.

This distinction between the few richly dowered and the many poor in spirit forms the basis of all Nietzsche's classifications of Noble and true Morality, Ascending and Decadent Morality, Aristocratic and Plebeian Morality, Individual and Herd Morality, Fine and Popular Morality, Active and Reactive Morality, Surpassing and Preservative Morality. For the mode of life determined by the possession of merely the will to live is different from the mode determined by the possession of a surplus of will, the Will to Power; different as the economy of a poor man is properly different from the economy of a rich

*Individual
cannot be a race*

man. And the mode proper to the poor in spirit Nietzsche names Morality in general, while he reserves the name Virtue for the modes of activity of the richly endowed.

Postponing to a later section the consideration of aristocratic morality, and dismissing from our minds the individuals in whom the Will to Power is incarnate, we have left the "many," the "herd," the "multitude." Now it is plain that in such a community there must be rules and regulations, expressing approval or disapproval, and tables enumerating things to be permitted, and things not to be permitted. Every institution is, in fact, created and defined by its rules; and no institution or organisation can exist without them. So far Nietzsche is in thorough agreement with the moralists in their recognition of the necessity for law. But plainly there are laws and laws; there are laws which originate explicitly and avowedly in men's minds, and are frankly devised for human convenience. Such laws are the parliamentary laws, the police regulations, and the rules and regulations of a great institution

like the post-office or the railway system. Recognised as human in their origin, they are recognised as fallible and subject to progressive adaptation. Since they are de-
vices for human convenience, their value ceases with their service ; and nobody invests them with sanctity or is ashamed to attempt their improvement. But this is not the case with the moral laws. About the moral code there hangs an atmosphere of sanctity which no human code possesses. It is true that the police regulations of society differ in no respect from the codes of private institutions ; but in the matter of conduct, and the regulation of what men ought to say, think, feel and do under given circumstances, society's code differs radically from the ordinary human code, and, in fact, takes on the special form of Morality.

But what constitutes the difference between moral laws and simple police regulations ? Nietzsche's reply is that the difference is due to the special claim made on behalf of moral laws of a universal and absolute nature. So far from claiming a human origin, they specifically repudiate

it, and seek their authority in revelation and the fiat of God or Nature. In this way their claim is to universality; morality is morality all the world over, and God or Nature has created a moral code which it is man's duty first to recognise (but not to discover) and then submissively and unquestioningly to follow.

It was by this act of transcendentalism that rational and human regulations were raised to the dignity of universal and inviolable natural laws; and the sanctions of omnipotence added to the sanctions of society. And there were excellent short-sighted reasons for this procedure. For it was impossible for society to maintain or even to obtain a real omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient police force, capable of detecting and punishing the secret breaches of society's code. And the imaginative creation of such a police in the form of an all-seeing, all-avenging God was therefore a master-stroke of instinct. Even in the interests of comfort it was plainly better to have a fixed and universal code than to invite a perpetual discussion.

It was just the perpetuity of becoming, and the eternally restless spirit of seeking, that the "many" did *not* want. In them was no "faith," no surplus of will, no ecstasy, no need for power; and therefore no need for "progress" and change. An absolute monarch sitting through eternity on the throne of the world, and promulgating edicts the same to-day, yesterday and forever, offered a much more restful prospect than that of the constant struggle of human laws for the absolute throne; or, most terrifying of all, the prospect of a free republic, or even a perpetual interregnum. Again, it was convenient to have an all-pervading police, watching the interests of society in the nooks and crannies of the individual mind; there was a sense of security in that. And such a police not only punished but prevented, not merely turned away men's wrath from each other, but actually turned it inwards. The "criminal" became so obliging as to punish himself! Then the code was universal and without exception. None escaped or could escape. In the eyes of the code all men

were equal, all equally under the law. From human laws men might escape by virtue of superior means, by cunning, by money, by reason, by personality ; but the moral law no soul could evade.

In a profounder sense too, it is not impossible to discover enormous significance to man in this act of universalising ; and Nietzsche is far from denying the deepening and ripening effects of belief in moral dogma. Thereby man was, as it were, seduced to tragedy. The petty police regulations of uncultured tribes, calling themselves nations, states, empires or what not, could have no such significance and interest as their apotheosis lent them. By that single act, men rose from the level of beasts to the tragic heights of man ; the little stage on which "forked radishes" had lived and died was magnified and ennobled to a stage on which heroes fought and died. Imaginary, unreal, fictitious, and black-magical as it all was, the drama of man became absorbing from the moment of the appearance of the *deus ex machina*. Morality lifted man above the beasts ; but it did not lift him above man.

The assumptions and presumptions involved in such a transfiguration of police regulations into universal morality were enormous; and the final effects of the universal sway were and are far from fulfilling the promise. If we may mythologize a little, and figure to ourselves the spectacle of a community of faint-hearts bartering their responsibility in return for divine superintendence, and selling their right to experiment for the price of freedom from the necessity of thought; we may behold them later bitterly ruing their bargain. For, so far from fulfilling the promise of preserving men and of giving them peace, goodwill, comfort, happiness—in fact, all the bourgeois beatitudes—universal morality, together with its idealism, has exercised a tyranny compared with which the tyranny of man is a kindly trifle. It was all the worse, because the tyranny could not be thrown off. So long as regulations are recognised as simply human devices for human convenience, their progressive adaptation to new circumstances is comparatively easy, but when they are

raised to absolute power, their alteration is a task of the greatest danger and difficulty.

Who lays violent hands upon a parliamentary law may or may not prove a reformer, but he is not regarded as a criminal and a sinner. But whoever lays a little finger on the moral code is regarded as an enemy of man, because he demonstrates his enmity to God. In such cases men's indignation is all the greater because they feel they are defending God. It is not man that is offended or threatened, but God. Man is thus reduced to vassalage; in a word, he is a slave. And the very code which promised him protection against man, ends by exposing him to the eternal enmity of God.

But let us consider the colossal presumption of the inventors of morality. Briefly, they presumed an absolute knowledge of the universal laws of life. Every absolute system implies absolute knowledge; and morality itself loses its absolute character just so soon as the doctrine of relativity is maintained. Nobody at this moment professes to know scientifically and absolutely the physical, intellectual and emotional

conditions most beneficial to life in general, still less the conditions most beneficial to any given individual. The area covered by science is still so small that the selection of conditions is almost wholly left to the instincts of a race. Such instincts may be healthy and may choose wisely ; but also they may be degenerate and choose what is bad. In either case they are outside the field of knowledge. The causes of degeneration are obscure, the causes of regeneration are equally obscure. We cannot kindle when we will the fire that in the heart resides. We do not know the conditions of life, the conditions even of health and happiness. Surely if they had been known, life and health and happiness would not after these millions of years be still so evanescent, so baffling, so difficult to seize, recover, or retain.

Yet ages ago, and long before the impartial investigation of causes and effects had been begun, society assumed that the laws, not merely of men's happiness, but of man's whole life, here and hereafter, were known from A to Z. Every moralist with

his table of Commandments presumes that knowledge now. Not a single preacher, writer, teacher or journalist but lays claims to omniscience every time he speaks of a moral law. Is there a single one of the accepted "virtues" that invariably and infallibly brings its promised reward? A single "sin" that brings its threatened punishment invariably, infallibly? We are not now concerned with physiological vices, which come within the sphere of science, and are regarded as follies or defects; but with moral declensions, such as selfishness, sensuality, pride, ambition, lying, the seven deadly sins. Is "sin" as sin punished? Does remorse even inevitably follow? Are the "good" invariably happy, and the "immoral" ugly and unhappy? Is "morality" really good for the body, or the soul, or the spirit? Is it known for a fact that "righteousness," in the moral sense, exalteth a nation?

Challenged individually, every moralist retires to the fastnesses of the universal, whence he derives his categorical imperative, his revealed law, his truth of nature,

his consensus of sages and prophets—in a word, his authority.

But what authority can there be for knowledge that is not knowledge? And Morality presumes a knowledge that no man, no race, no community, has ever demonstrated its claim to possess.

In spite, however, of the universal and despotic nature of morality, the moral code *has* changed with every age. The “virtues” of to-day are the “vices” of yesterday. Thanks to successful crimes, most of the articles of the moral code are in perpetual transformation. This in itself is proof enough that there never was any universal morality, and that every age has raised to absolute power errors and imperfect generalisations. On the other hand, the code itself still maintains its authority. Though most of the articles of our code are different from the articles of the Old Testament Code or the code of the ancient Aryans, yet exactly the same claims are made on behalf of the morality of our day as were made in the days of Noah and the Rishis, namely, that it is divinely ordained, and

universally rooted in the nature of things. That belief in the code as code constitutes in fact morality itself. It is not belief in the efficacy for man of this or that mode of life, for such belief must give its evidence and experience, and is as open to Nietzsche as to any moralist. Nor is it any longer the belief that some extra-cosmic Jehovah has tabulated his approvals and disapprovals in the form of commandments, which he has revealed to the few for the sake of the many; for all the specific laws of past revelation have been challenged on grounds of reason. No, it is the belief that over and above the world of cause and effect, as known to us, there is another real world, parallel to the first, in which causes and effects are miraculously changed. Such changes are brought about by the operation of moral principles, which in themselves are totally unknown and unknowable to science. By means of this parallel world a meaning is given to the phenomenal world, whereby innocent causes are transformed into crimes and sins, and innocent effects into punishments and executioners. To the eye of the

scientist and realist, phenomenal effect follows upon the heels of phenomenal cause, without arousing in his mind any other interpretation than that of the majestic order and sequence of the living panorama, whose units are linked each to the other in the eternal process of becoming. On the heels of one kind of action decadence treads; on the heels of another kind throngs an ascending life. He notes the conditions of the one, and the conditions of the other. They are verifiable, calculated, scientific. So far as he goes, cause and effect are all that exist for him.

But the moralist has a different eye and a special interpretation. Having presumed to absolute knowledge, he now assumes an absolute knower, and not merely a knower, but a knower benevolently disposed towards man. There would, in fact, be no meaning in morality were it not presumed that the universe was moral, that God was on the side of morality. Nor again could there be any value in morality if God's morality or nature's morality were not, in the long run if not in the short run,

identical with man's morality. In other words, the moralist assumes that God or Nature exists for the sake of man. But from this, it follows that the procession of cause and effect is not merely a spectacular display before æsthetic consciousness, but a process having an ulterior purpose, and that a human purpose. Hence phenomena have a meaning of their own, a meaning given to them not by man himself but by God; a meaning for man and his salvation. Causes are not simply causes, they are crimes against God or virtues on behalf of God. Effects are not simply effects, they are rewards, they are punishments, they are warnings, they are encouragements. The Universe looks after man, is interested in him, in his smallest doings. The Universe revolves about me!

The price, however, of such an interest is very high, and even the protection of God may be too dearly bought. The colossal presumption that men *knew* the laws of life, when in fact they did not know them, delayed for millenniums the attempt honestly to discover them. The no less enor-

mous assumption that the Universe cares for man, has postponed the development of the most precious of all human qualities, the quality of responsibility. How is it possible to regard oneself as responsible when the Universe has been declared responsible? If God is alone responsible for me, how can I be responsible for myself? *Secundum*
If there are moral laws, fixed and universal, the expression of God's eternal will, what am I more than a slave, a speck of dust, a wandering atom? God's responsibility is man's irresponsibility. "Moral" and "autonomous" are mutually exclusive. *→ Co. 1. 1. 1.*

But even that excellent and childlike sense of irresponsibility is denied to man under the law. It is true that God is responsible, but man is also responsible. God is responsible (to whom?) for creating the eternal moral laws, but man is responsible for keeping them. But who or which of us can keep all the moral laws? There never was, nor will be, a perfectly moral man, never a single soul free from crime against God, never a single soul to escape punishment. Since Adam, the first man, not one

man has been all good ; all have been sinners. And this conception has darkened the earth and made it a place of shame, punishment and sin. All our human institutions have indeed borrowed their darker hues from this tragic conception. The doctrine of Crime and Punishment, falsely attributed to Nature, has thence spread to all the activities of man. Our very codes of human justice are befouled by this moral miasma. Outside our hospitals and lunatic asylums, where almost alone, the superior human conceptions of Cause and Effect prevail, and morality ceases to praise with rewards and condemn with punishments, all our institutions regard themselves as vice-regents of the moral law. Having demanded poetic justice from God (as if he were some popular novelist) we proceed to demand it of institutions and of men. Institutions are not regarded as either of service or not of service ; men, books, art, religion, science, are not interrogated as to their utility to man ; but all these are considered as good or evil in themselves. And the worst of this romanticism is that it quite

as often happens that the morally bad is the socially good, and the morally impeccable, the socially useless. This we recognise in the special allowances made for what is called the practical, as distinct from the ideal. In plain words, in practice we are never moral.

Now Nietzsche, as a realist and a practical thinker, fulminates against this fatal and perfidious divorce of practice and ideals. Since practice is real, and ideals are only ideas seeking to impose themselves on practice, the alternative is between changing our practice to fit our ideals, and changing our ideals to fit our practice. But this, in fact, is no alternative, for, as we have seen, our practice can never be ideal. The sensible thing to do is therefore to conform our ideals with our practice, to sit patiently, as it were, at the doors of our unfoldment, and assist in the becoming of ourselves; not endeavouring to distort our natures into conformity with abstract ideas, the idols of civilization and morality; but endeavouring to give them scope and room for the exfoliation of their own inner

*chance
promise*

and propelling needs. For, if Nietzsche proposed to abolish Morality in the sense of an external formulated code, he never dreamed that by so doing he would not enable real morality, the laws whereby an individual lives, as truly as an acorn grows by the laws of oaks, to show itself, and take the place of the pretender and tyrant. To transcend Morality was, for Nietzsche, to substitute Virtue and a man's own inherent nature for conformity and hypocrisy.

MORALITY

Let us pronounce this new demand: we stand in need of a criticism of moral values.

On the day on which with full heart we say: "Forward march! our old morality too is a piece of comedy!"—on that day we shall have discovered a new complication and possibility for the Dionysian drama of the "fate of the soul."

Whereas on the one hand, all noble morality takes its rise from a triumphant Yes-saying to oneself, slave-morality will, on the other hand, from the very beginning, say No to something "exterior," "different," "not-self"; this No being its creative deed . . . its action is, throughout, reaction.

"Autonomous" and "moral" are mutually preclusive terms.

Chastity and sensuality are not necessarily antithetical ; every true marriage, every genuine love-affair, is past that antithesis.

. . . .

There could be no greater, no more fatal misunderstanding than if the happy, the well-constituted, the mighty in body and soul were to begin to doubt their own right to happiness.

. . . .

Older than the pleasure received from the "I" is the pleasure received from the herd ; and as long as the good conscience is called herd, only the bad conscience saith "I."

. . . .

"Sir Hazard,"—that is the earliest nobility of the world, which I restored unto all things. I saved them from the slavery of serving an end.

. . . .

In comparison with remote ages, our age is surprisingly immoral.

. . . .

Popular morality is comparable to popular medicine ; there is no science in either.

The idea of sin and punishment diverted man's wrath from his neighbour to himself.

. . .

Life would be intolerable but for its moral significance? But why should not your life be intolerable?

. . .

Morals are perpetually being transformed by successful crimes.

. . .

Pity like any other craving may be fed to excess.

. . .

Suppose that altruism were really practised, should we not fly from our neighbour?

. . .

Who suffers when we are depressed by the misery of others? *They* do.

. . .

If man would no longer think himself wicked, he would cease to be so.

. . .

If moral judgments are the judgments of health, then criminals are diseased and should be treated as such.

. . .

Briefly, the new thing we want : we no

longer want to turn causes into sinners and consequences into executioners.

. . .
“Somebody must be to blame because I *feel* badly”;—this kind of logic is shared by all the sick.

. . .
Now and then I did something for sufferers, but I always seemed unto myself to do something better when I learned how to enjoy myself better.

. . .
Morality is the herd-instinct in the individual.

. . .
The moral world also is round.

. . .
What does “a moral order of the world” signify? That there is once for all a will of God as to what men have to do and what they have not to do.

. . .
There are no moral phenomena, there are only moral interpretations of phenomena.

. . .
What is Christian altruism if not the collective egoism of the feeble?

To some you must prove your morals useful, and to others useless.

One of the noblest inventions of Christianity: to discover the way to heaven through the hell of induced despair.

You know this will hurt people? I do; but I shall suffer twice for it, from my pity and their revenge.

If a man compels himself to think "against the grain," he will at last fall ill, for this apparently moral self-command is as bad as debauchery

Not things, but opinions of imaginary things, have been the source of endless trouble to man.

The preaching of chastity is an incitement to anti-naturalness.

Remorse is indecent.

There is no such thing as a moral fact.

Punishment does not purify, because crime does not soil.

The more emancipated from religion
the more imperious does morality become.

. . .

Every purely moral valuation ends in
nihilism.

. . .

The great moments of culture were al-
ways from the moral point of view epochs
of corruption; the epochs of domestication
were always periods of intolerance of in-
tellectual and daring natures.

. . .

The means of conserving a superior race
are the means of destroying the inferior
race.

. . .

Education ruins the exception for the
sake of the rule.

. . .

Whoever has not two-thirds of his time
to himself is a slave.

. . .

The idealist conceals facts from him-
self; the liar from others.

. . .

All that has hitherto been regarded as
the cause of degeneration is the effect of it.

Every triumph of an ideal has been a retrogressive movement.

. . . .

Physiological confusions are the source of all evil.

. . . .

Virtue is our greatest misunderstanding.

. . . .

The race is corrupted not by its vices but by its ignorance.

. . . .

Love of humanity is *in practice* preference for the feeble and the suffering.

. . . .

Even virtue cannot be made to reign by virtuous means.

. . . .

A morality that binds everyone alike is not only an inducement to great deeds by small men ; but a seduction of great men to small deeds.

GOOD AND EVIL

THE universal character claimed by Morality is nowhere more evident than in the concepts of Good and Evil. The word "Evil" in particular has an absolute value in ethics and morality, and implies not mere temporary and relative unfitness, but essential defect. Bad things may be, as we all recognize, only bad in relation to some particular end. For other ends they may be good. But an evil thing is not simply a bad thing for one purpose and a good thing for another purpose ; it is bad through and through and everywhere and always. Similarly, the concept of Good has an absolute form. There are supposed to be things whose good is not determinable by relation to any end, but which are in themselves good everywhere and always. All the so-

called virtues and all the so-called vices belong to the absolute categories.

Now the assumption involved in affirming the absolute nature of any specific concept of Good or of Evil lies in this: a knowledge of absolute conditions is presupposed.

The moment we declare that any particular act, feeling, or thought, is good everywhere and always, we affirm our knowledge of the conditions prevailing everywhere and always. Moreover, it implies that predetermined laws have been laid down, creating good and evil, out of all relation to any conceivable end. For the moment any end is definitely conceived, and means are taken to accomplish it, all actions fall naturally into the two classes of good for that end, bad for that end. In other words, any end whatever takes us out of the absolute category, and out of the domain of the absolute concepts Good and Evil. When Nietzsche speaks of transcending morality in the form of getting "beyond Good and Evil," it is this absoluteness that he is proposing to reduce to relativity. As a matter

of practice, all conduct is relative to some end, and therefore either good or bad. But in the sphere of ethics, conduct is supposed to have another value than that of means to a specific end, namely, as means to an absolute end, which is a contradiction in terms. The conception of an absolute Good and an absolute evil is, Nietzsche observes, characteristic of slave, that is, popular morality. All slave natures demand a master, and in the absence of real masters they will invent imaginary ones. Thus, it is plain to the realist that serfdom in England has been abolished only in the political sense. Economic serfdom still exists, and the serfdom of the intellect is as yet so ingrained that comparatively few have realised its existence. Yet in itself the elevation of any principle, ideal, virtue, or concept, to an absolute value, is voluntary serfdom. To declare that there is anything absolutely, fixedly, and forever and always good, is to declare at the same instant that man's valuations are to be submitted to an authority, that he cannot make a good for himself, that he is not permitted

to define good, but only to discover and accept a given and despotic good. In short, it is the admission of a master. Every idealist is therefore a slave of one degree or another.

But let us suppose that the absolute concepts of Good and Evil have been abandoned, that "Morality" in that sense has been transcended, and that all idealisms (or rather idolatries) have been pulled off their thrones, the result would not at all confirm the forebodings of the moralist, who foresee anarchy, licence and red ruin behind every opponent of absolute concepts. On the other hand, there would remain exactly the same necessary division of actions into good and bad, of persons into good and bad, of institutions into good and bad. Because we do not call a vicious dog a wicked dog, it does not follow that the dog is not a bad dog, *i.e.*, bad from our human valuation. Similarly, so soon as we cease to classify acts into good and evil, into pleasing to God or displeasing to God, we do not cease to be bound to approve or disapprove them on our own account and

to call them good when we approve and bad when we disapprove. Approval and disapproval, in fact, are the effects of the reaction of our individual temperaments or circumstances. We can no more help approving or disapproving under given conditions than we can help feeling hungry or thirsty. Our "judgments" are simply the measure of the elasticity of our temperament, consequently no change of intellectual concept could involve a loss of this natural selective quality of living things. Since all living things are different, all living things have a need of selection peculiar to each of them. On the whole, its approvals are its choices of what is good ; its disapprovals its rejections of what is bad for it. Biologically, our emotional responses express the needs of our instincts.

It follows that an absolute concept, which declares that a given conduct is universally good or universally bad, is in the first place no more rational than a declaration that grain is the proper food of all animals ; and, secondly, is in practice no more effective. Pretend as we may, it rarely happens that

our personal approvals or disapprovals are exactly in accord with the theoretical virtues. We do not always admire "virtue" when we see it, or condemn "vice" when it is most obvious. But we purchase the right to this private judgment only by pretending publicly (publicly even to ourselves) that virtue nevertheless always does call forth admiration and vice indignation.

But it is intellectual honesty that Nietzsche demands in these matters. And honesty admits that the "moral" man does not always command respect, nor the "immoral" man forfeit it. Our feelings, in short, refuse to be guided by our ideals. And since they refuse to be thus controlled, the removal of those ideals would leave our feelings very much the same. In other words, we should then have our Good and our Bad, our list of approvals and disapprovals, even though every shred of belief in the moral intention of the universe had disappeared.

At the bottom of our moral attitudes lies, in fact, that quality of selection inherent

in all living things. I approve; I disapprove; these are the final statements to which so-called moral judgments may be reduced; and the frank recognition of this fact instantly takes us out of the realm of the universal, since no man claims that his personal approvals are universally valid and binding, or, if he makes the claim, can maintain it except by means which deny it.

On the other hand, to throw the individual entirely upon himself, and to allow him to determine his conduct by his own personal approvals and disapprovals, is felt to be dangerous to society.

An individual may easily commend himself quite sincerely for acts which society just as sincerely condemns. In such cases there is a conflict between temperaments, the temperament of the individual being different from the temperament of the community. This is, and must be, the case of those specially endowed and abundantly vitalised natures, in whom there is a surplus of will. That very surplus in them seeks naturally for outlet and expression. Its action is an outpouring and an over-

flowing, a breaking of bonds and a Dionysian ecstasy of energy. Its very existence is proof that the conditions of self-preservation proper to the multitude do not apply here. An entirely new standard of good and bad is set up. If with the multitude, good is what preserves, and bad is what destroys; then with such an individual good must be what renders the surplus more and more abundant, and bad is what ever tends to diminish the surplus.

It is not, be it understood, a question of universality or a common good and evil; but a quite individual question. Such people may be supposed to say: good is what makes me productive, bad is what makes me sterile. With the question of the conditions of production or sterility in general and for the multitude, they have no concern. Being themselves specially endowed and uniquely gifted, their good and their bad is wholly their own affair. To subject them to another valuation, and to lay upon them the commandments proper to another mode and kind of life, is to put restraint upon them, and to

make them unproductive and sterile. That, in effect, is the complaint of individuals against society as a solid, respectable majority; not at all that the majority are wrong in living by their own rules, but in their arrogation of the right to enforce those rules upon the favoured minority. The claim of the individual, so soon as he is conscious of his power, is to determine for himself the nature of good and bad. He is essentially and necessarily an ethical nonconformist, and is driven to ethical protestantism only against the claims of society to determine his good and his bad for him.

Of course it is true that such an individual with his personal ethic may, in the estimation of the multitude, be simply an iconoclastic philosopher, or he may be a criminal. The distinction between the great saviours and great criminals is difficult to define. Every breach of a universal code is from the moral standpoint, a sin; but under certain conditions the "sin" may justify itself in its effects. In any case, the improvement and progress of society are entirely dependent upon such breaches,

and hence these superior individuals, whether finally acclaimed as prophets or as criminals, are the saving grace of life. But for them the procession of life might conceivably come to an end. It is they who turn the wheel of reasoning on which the multitude are bound.

But if that is true, then the salvation of society depends on its apparent enemies. Society is saved by its rebels. From time to time the pressure of despotic ideals on society becomes intolerable, and a "crime," a declension from the code, a "sin," is the only possible means of relief. It follows then that society and the multitude in their own interests must permit the existence of favoured individuals, in order to provide a means of escape from its own rigidity.

But the condition of the existence of these favoured individuals is freedom from the common yoke of common ideals. They may be anything they please, so long as they are different from the multitude. Their peculiar pleasure, in fact, must be different in essence from the peculiar pleasure of the man ; their approvals must

be individual and self-authorised, depending upon no common standard or ideal or tradition. Their virtue must be inimitable, unique and individual. Responsibility for their own uniqueness is their only morality. —The question, of course, arises whether such men may not be injurious and even fatal to society. The answer is, that they must necessarily constitute a danger to society. Were they not dangerous they would be useless. Their virtue lies precisely in their power to create—and destroy. ? *Handwritten scribble*

Yet, as already suggested, a society without enemies, or rather without dangers, is already doomed. Every virtue, even of current morality, is a virtue only in so far as it is a necessity. Virtues that do not spring from imperative needs are mere theories. Yet to give need to virtues, and to make them real, demands that they shall be exposed to perpetual danger. Thus in the vital economy of a society, privileged individuals are necessary, because and not in spite of their danger. The risks of nourishing and cherishing criminals must be

run if the hope of creating saviours is to be entertained. For, be it noted, the same conditions of freedom that develop the one are necessary to the other. God and Devil are grown upon the same soil. And if in our fear of devils we destroy the conditions that breed them, we at the same time destroy the conditions from which our gods may arise.

But concerning the nature of individual or "aristocratic" morality, Nietzsche has invented a test of which he makes use in art and religion as well. Remembering that virtue is always active, and belongs to the surplus of will alone, the distinction of individual good is that the "giving" will is present. The instinctive desire to pour out life and not to preserve or amass life; the will to spend and not to acquire, the virtues of liberality, courage, gaiety, strength, the sense of inexhaustible powers, the atmosphere of an original fount and source of life, the spirit of self-giving, of prodigality, of ecstasy, of careless rapture in action, of spontaneity—all these are characteristic of the richly-endowed

natures. In one sense, it is clear that they are "moral" in the highest sense, and conform to the theoretical conceptions of the multitude. But, in another sense, they are "immoral," immoral, that is, in the view of the multitude, who, by a singular fatuity, invariably fail to recognise their own ideals in actual practice. Jesus of Nazareth, for example, was for Nietzsche the great type of aristocratic morality. His life and his doctrine were the overflowing of a superabundant vitality, expressing carelessness and spontaneity, rich prodigality and a sense of inexhaustible resources in the highest degree. Yet the multitude knew him not; and it has been the irony of Christianity that its doctrines and ethics have been erected upon the grave of the dead Jesus.

In Nietzsche's opinion the triumph of Christianity was, in fact, the defeat of Jesus. Jesus had said that his mission was to bring life and bring it more abundantly. In this he was thoroughly Dionysian, thoroughly, if it may be said, Nietzschean. But the multitude prevailed; and in place of the

recognition that Jesus sought to inspire of the superior virtue of life-giving, the exactly contrary doctrine of life-saving prevailed. In Nietzsche's terminology Christianity represented a successful slave-revolt against the aristocratic valuations taught by Jesus. It was the suffering Christ that triumphed over the joyful Christ; and during all the Christian centuries, but for the brief periods of the Italian Renaissance, and the age of Goethe and Napoleon, the morality of the multitude has succeeded in imposing itself upon the virtue of the few.

So successful has been that slave revolt that even now slave values dominate; even now the rich in spirit feel bound to pretend that they too are poor in spirit; even now individuals are ashamed of their individuality and of all that makes them different, unique. Upon that precious surplus of will, upon which depends the everlasting renewal of life, has been placed the ban of sin and shame.

OF GOOD AND EVIL

Beyond good and evil. . . . This does, at any rate, *not* mean "Beyond Good and Bad."

. . .
Aristocratic equation of values : good
= noble = powerful = beautiful = happy
= beloved of God.

. . .
Plebeian equation : good = wretched =
poor = lowly = sufferers = sick = ugly =
beloved of God.

. . .
Men have made for themselves all their
good and evil.

. . .
Beware of the good and just ! They
would fain crucify those who invent their
own standards of virtue ; they hate the
lonely one.

. . .
What regard we as the bad and the

worst thing? Is it not *degeneration*? And we always suspect degeneration wherever the giving soul is lacking.

All names of good and evil are images; they speak not out, they only beckon.

What is good is easy.

What is good? All that increases the feeling of power, will to power, power itself, in man.

What is bad? All that proceeds from weakness.

To be brave is good.

The good sacrifice *unto themselves* the future.

Whatever is done with a sense of power is felt to be good.

What is done from love is always done "beyond good and evil."

What is believed by the folk as good and evil betrayeth unto me an old will unto power.

Let me confess : as your wisest men did not appear unto me to be so very wise, so I found men's wickedness much less than the fame of it.

. . . .

Whoever liveth among the good is taught to lie by pity.

. . . .

The stupidity of the good is unfathomably clever.

. . . .

He hath discovered himself who saith : " This is my good and evil." Thereby he hath made mute the mole and dwarf who saith : " Good for all, Evil for all."

. . . .

No good, no bad, but *my* taste, for which I have neither shame nor concealment.

. . . .

Good men never speak the truth.

. . . .

The Christian resolve to find the world evil and ugly has made the world evil and ugly.

. . . .

When thou hast a virtue and it is thy virtue, thou hast it in common with nobody.

When I saw my devil, I found him earnest, thorough, deep, solemn ; he was the spirit of gravity—through him all things fall.

. . . .
The danger of the noble one is to become an insolent, a sneering one, a destroyer.

. . . .
The noble one wisheth to create something new and a new virtue.

. . . .
Art thou a slave ? If thou be, thou canst not be a friend.

. . . .
Art thou a tyrant ? If thou be, thou canst not have a friend.

. . . .
Your love for your neighbour is your bad love for yourselves.

. . . .
I consider love unto things and ideas to be higher than love unto men.

. . . .
Canst thou be thy own judge and the avenger of thine own law ?

. . . .
When ye are raised above all praise and blame, and your will seeketh to command

all things, as the will of a loving one, there is the origin of your virtue.

When ye despise what is agreeable and a soft bed, and know not how to make your bed far enough from the effeminate, there is the origin of your virtue.

When ye will one will and that end of all your trouble is called necessity by you—there is the origin of your virtue.

There are some who say “Virtue is necessary ;” but in reality they only believe police to be necessary.

That *your* self be in your action as a mother is in the child, that shall be for me *your* word of virtue.

To save men from revenge, that is for me the bridge towards the highest hope.

Hungry, violent, lonely, godless . . . free from the happiness of slaves, fearless and fear-inspiring ; this is the will of the truthful one.

My first manly prudence is that I admit

myself to be deceived in order not to be compelled to guard myself against deceivers.

. . . .

My second : I spare the *conceited* more than the proud.

. . . .

My third : I allow not the sight of the *wicked* to be made disagreeable through your fear.

. . . .

At bottom they desire plainly one thing most of all,—to be hurt by nobody. But this is cowardice, though it be called “virtue.”

. . . .

The self-joy of noble bodies and souls calleth itself virtue.

. . . .

Verily, it is no commandment for to-day and to-morrow, to *learn* how to love oneself. It is rather the finest, cunningest, last and most patient of arts.

. . . .

That is to-day called virtue by all petty folk : namely, pity. They feel no reverence for great misfortune, for great ugliness, for great failure.

If anything in me is virtue, it is that I had no fear in the presence of any prohibition.

Nothing is to-day regarded by me as more valuable and rare than honesty.

May we not suppose the future criminal dictating his own punishment, secure in the sense that he has made his own law?

Not "Virtue is the health of the soul;" but "Thy virtue is the health of thy soul."

To become what we are—unique, incomparable, our own law-givers, our own creators.

This is the true, ideal selfishness: ever to provide and watch and restrain the soul, that our productiveness may come to a beautiful issue.

Selfishness has as much value as the physiological value of him who possesses it; it may be very valuable, or it may be vile and contemptible.

A virtue must be *our* contrivance, *our*

most personal self-defence and necessity ;
in every other sense it is merely a danger.

What destroys faster than to work,
think or feel, without internal necessity,
without a profoundly personal choice,
without *pleasure*?

The " thou " hath been declared holy
but the " I " not yet.

For him who is born to command,
humble self-effacement and self-abnega-
tion are not virtues, but vices.

A constant struggle against uniformly
unfavourable conditions is what makes a
type stable and hard.

We might conceive a *consciousness of*
power on the part of society so far ad-
vanced as to permit itself the noblest of
all luxuries which it can afford—to let her
wrong-doer go unpunished.

Justice ends, like all good things on
earth, by abrogating itself. This self-
abrogation of justice—mercy—is the privi-
lege of the mightiest one.

✓ What is my happiness worth? . . .
My happiness should itself justify existence.

. . .
What is my reason worth? Longeth
it for knowledge as a lion for its food?

. . .
What is my virtue worth? It has not yet
lashed me into rage.

. . .
What is my pity worth? . . . My pity is
no crucifixion.

. . .
I love him whose soul wasteth itself,
who neither wanteth thanks nor returneth
aught, for he always giveth and seeketh
nothing to keep for himself.

WILLING, VALUING AND CREATING

WITHOUT entering here into the problems of philosophic idealism, it is enough to admit that the world must present a very different appearance to a non-human being from the appearance it presents to man. Myriads of entirely new and strange possibilities would open up, and the whole world would be transfigured according to the likeness of the creature beholding it.

Such a consideration leads to the conclusion that man is the creator and inventor of all the human values and significances of the world. But for him those values would not exist, except potentially. For the world is only the raw material and background on which and by means of which any being marks his appreciation and needs.

Yet it is undeniable that the world as it appears to us is formed on a hierarchy of values, each degree of which is necessarily determined by its value to man. At the very top of the scale lie all those modes and materials of experience which man values in the highest degree ; and at the bottom lie those modes and materials of which man either cannot make use, or wills not to make use. In plain words, the world as it appears to man exists for the sake of man ; man has created the world as it appears to him.

But the question must be raised, By what standard of value has man created the hierarchy of values we call the world ? What measure and test has he employed to determine the superior and inferior values ? Why, for example, is music more humanly valued than noise, love more than lust, St. Paul's more than a villa. These are thoroughly practical questions, on the answer to which turns the whole secret of the meaning of the world.

Nietzsche's reply is that things are valued by man exactly in proportion as they

promise power. The nature of becoming life being in essence the will to power, all things that promise nutriment and increase of power are valued highly. On the other hand, those things which promise nothing are of little or no value. Men's values are the index of men's needs.

But since only those peoples and individuals give value to things whose will to power is abundant, only peculiarly endowed peoples and individuals are capable of creating, that is, lending to things new and high values. The mass of people accept valuations already created by the few. It is the few alone who give new significances to things.

Chief among these are artists and philosophers. All artists are either creators of new values or glorifiers of old values. It is the artist who picks up from the roadsides of the world some hitherto, neglected, meaningless and unobserved thing, and gives it by his magic an attraction and a value for men. All the beauty that men now see in Nature was not, as it were, a beauty already there awaiting discovery ;

but a void and formless potentiality, in which the artist might create a glorious illusion, real for men. The world as we behold it is through and through an imaginative creation, the work of great creative and imaginative artists who, like the spirit of God before the first day, brooded upon the face of shapeless and meaningless chaos.

It is in this sense, again, that artists of all men are the most necessary in the economy of life, for not only do they give things value that before had no value, but they alone can destroy old values and old creations. If the magical praise of the artist can cast such glamour over the minds of men, that gold and silver, rank and titles, land and sea, dignity and majesty, work, duty, religion, and all the rest of human things, differentiating man from the animals, pass as real, and actually become real; then equally his blame can take from the same things their magical glamour and attraction. Where the artist leads there the people follow; he is the standard-bearer, the inspiring pioneer, the creator of new worlds, new values, new mean-

ings, and he it is who also follows in the rear and turns men's minds from clinging to old superstitions, abandoned values, and worn-out means.

But the artist, just because he is the greatest, is also the most dangerous of all the devices of life for its own increase. It is true that art alone gives value, art alone invents and creates ; but what if the artist be mistaken ? What if the promise of life that he gives to things be not fulfilled ? It is easy enough (for examples have been numerous) to conceive the artist endowing with supreme attraction the worst things for man. As artist he is concerned solely with the background for his art that things supply. He must sing his songs where he can, set up his glamouring flag where he stands, and play upon his pipes wherever he happens to be. That is his nature, his morality, his own inner need. What has he to do, as siren of man, with the fate of man ? Though he foresee dangers to man from following after him, yet his business is to play and to play on.

Hence the need for the philosopher, the

great *experimenter* for man. First among men to hear the magical crying of the artist on the dim horizons of the as yet untrodden, uncreated world, it is his duty to follow the call, to venture himself, to volunteer on behalf of man a personal test. For the artist as artist is like a bird. He can fly in the air over precipices and ways that would utterly destroy the pedestrian race of men. Hence his experiences are of no value to man as man. The poet's mode of life is not a human mode, not a mode of example. It is the philosopher who must essay the path on behalf of men. Human himself, in the strictest and best disciplined sense, the philosopher of all men must be least likely to fail. Given his success, given his report from the fabulous land of the artists' Goshen that the grapes thereof are good, that they are *good for men*, and the race may then strike its tents and march, philosopher at the head, artist leading like the pillar of fire and the column of smoke. That is one conception of art and philosopher in their relation to human values.

But Nietzsche had another and a pro-

founder meaning to give them, a meaning, moreover, bearing more closely on the problem of the future of man.

Hitherto, as he says, the people alone have created ; poets have been driven by popular sentiments, and have seldom dared to use their wings for flying. They have been afraid, and held in awe by their respect for the populace. But what if in the future the philosopher, hitherto a man of books and theories, should become the falconer, the seeker after new worlds ? What if the philosopher should be able to experience ahead of the race, and persuade the artist to glorify the things of a new life ? It was this dream which led Nietzsche to sketch his vision of the "coming philosophers," the philosophers of the great Perhaps ; and finally to project for them and as their peculiar task the next goal of man, the creation of Superman. In some respects it was natural for Nietzsche as philosopher to demand precedence of philosophy over art. Plato had done the same before him, and every philosophic thinker has endeavoured to define

the relatively subordinate place of the artist. And if we take Nietzsche's conception of the artist as the "bugler and trumpeter" of man's war against the formless world, we must conclude that in the human race there is or should be an officer who should direct the playing of the trumpets and determine its occasion and duration. That in effect was to be the office of the philosopher, who in this way would become the advance-guard of humanity. Then the creation of new ends and new meanings would be in his hands, while the artist, as ever, would glorify and englamour. Art in the service of philosophy must not, however, be conceived as a slavery, but rather as the fulfilling of its special function. For art must glorify something, and in the absence of great philosophic ideas, art will glorify popular ideas. The difference in short would be the difference between serving the multitude, the sick, comfort-seeking many, and serving the few, the individuals in whom life was superabundant. Once more Nietzsche offers the choice between

popular art and great art, between art designed instinctively to preserve men, and the art designed and philosophically intended to surpass men. As valuers and creators, the great philosopher and the great artist may be supposed to be one.

But in what sense can it be said that philosophers are capable of creating? Again we are brought face to face with Nietzsche's concept of the world as an eternal process of becoming. At every instant in the whole process the world is incomplete, fragmentary, imperfect. These conditions are eternal conditions. There is no completeness, no whole, no perfection, no being. The universe is not a clock wound up to run down; nor a seed capable of a limited growth. Such things are images of aspects of the eternal process. But the process itself contains these and all other modes in an eternal circle of ever-becoming. Thus perfection, rest, salvation, wholeness have no more than a relative meaning. In their absolute sense they have no meaning whatever.

But, as already observed, Nietzsche con-

ceives this process to be maintained only by the action of the will to power. That, in fact, is the energy and the spring of the circle of life. In human affairs it operates by giving to living things due directions and desires. Whoever inspires humanity with a new need lengthens the duration of the life of the race; and at the same time intensifies that life; for a new need is the voice of an instinct seeking to mix itself with life, and in the long run every instinct must be satisfied, since the "world" is no more than the pasturage of instincts. But new needs can only become conscious in the presence of objects that promise to satisfy them. With no such object present or conceived, the instincts fail of their proper employment, and turn upon each other; and one of the results of that interne-cine struggle of instincts is to produce the "introspective," self-centred, internalised man. That, in short, is the physiological and individual type produced by civilisation. Civilisation being essentially a "quarantine" for certain instincts, inevitably produces a type of mind in which such instincts

have nothing else to do but struggle internally. The "civilised" man is either feeble or unhappy, either, that is, so poorly vitalised as to have no other needs than a civic corporation can satisfy, or so richly endowed as to be dimly aware of frustrated and thwarted longings in himself.

Under such circumstances, the creator of new objects of desire is indeed a saviour of men; for he brings into the field of vision of those frustrated instincts their very bread of life. Varying the metaphor, he gives them an outlet from the mind, which henceforth they cease to torment, and such minds become happy and are "saved."

The chief means of such philosophic creation must not, however, be conceived too grossly. Objects of desire must include all that men call ideals and ulterior ends and visions of the future. For example, the creation of an ideal Republic was Plato's great object of desire. In that, his instincts had their fulfilment and satisfaction. Again, the creation of Superman was the imperious need of Nietzsche. For that and

to that he was prepared to sacrifice everything. In this sense, love of ideals is superior to love of material objects, for it implies a finer eye, a keener vision, and the possession of a long will that dares to demand for itself a remote thing.

But amongst ideals Nietzsche distinguishes between those that beckon men onwards and those that beckon upwards. All ideals that are merely as it were the future tenses of existing things are ideals beckoning onwards; but ideals which are abstract, contrary to nature, impossible of realisation and despotic, are false.

All realisable ideals turn upon fact as their base. And it is by virtue of a superior vision, imagination and will that the philosopher discerns in existing facts their possible future. All history, says Nietzsche, is meaningless until a great creator gives it a meaning. Oppressed as we are by the idea of evolution, we ordinarily conclude that the great man, or the great event, is merely the culmination of a series of small men and small events. But, in Nietzsche's view, he is that culmination not by virtue of

an inherent and inevitable exfoliation, but by virtue of a power to create. Grasping merely one out of the many possibilities of a given situation, the great man actualises it. Another type of great man would have actualised quite another possibility. It was not foreordained that this and not that should be chosen; it was the great man who perceived the blank surface awaiting an inscription and wrote upon it his own name. Henceforth, he is the meaning of the situation, he has given it significance. But the significance was not given to him.

Thus we turn naturally to the contemplation of the great man, the individual in whom creative power is full, who can give meaning to things, fulfilling the fragmentary, and solving the riddles of life.

Nietzsche's view of him is that he is incarnate will, a man in whom all instincts are "oriented" and focussed upon a single point. For Nietzsche discriminates between the instincts and the will only to the extent of regarding will as the sum total of a man's instincts. There is not, he

says, a special sort of power called will, separate and distinct from the instincts : but the resultant of the activity of the instincts is itself the will. Thus the difference between strong will and weak will, is not the difference between one single power and another single power. It is the difference between the total sum of one set of instincts and the total sum of another set. When in any individual all the instincts move in the same direction, there is a strong will. But when they move in different directions, and are thwarted from without, so as to move against each other, then they result in what men call a feeble and vacillating will.

Now the special quality of great individuals is their possession of "oriented" instincts. In them—or as it were through them—flow streams of instinct in a single majestic current, without let or hindrance, without internal thwarting or deflection. Issuing as a single purpose and aim, which, in fact, they create, the individual of whom they are the expression becomes a centre of force and life. It is in him that

the surplus is manifested and available. Behind all beings stands the "mighty lord," the instincts of Life itself, but owing to all kinds of accidents, the "mighty lord" fails to find his way through into the world of things. Where the flow of instinct is felt to be free and unimpeded, there the individual feels himself to be free; not free, in the sense that he can choose what is not natural to him, but free in the only meaning of freedom, that his instincts really choose what they desire. They know their ends, they know the way thither, and encountering no obstacle, the man feels free.

But, again, the warning must be made that this sense of freedom is necessarily conditioned by resistance. We feel freest when we feel strongest, and we feel strongest when we are succeeding under the most difficult circumstances. Let anybody ask himself if he has not felt most free just when he knew himself winning against great odds. The sense of freedom, in fact, depends quite as much on contact with resistance as on the flow of instincts. Since

those instincts are in essence a will to power, it is natural that they should feel their highest satisfaction just when their power is most called out. Hence the need for reality in all objects of desire, as well as the need for enemies in every sense. The greater the desire and the greater the external obstacles to that desire, the greater will be the sense of power, and therefore of happiness. For happiness is not an end, but a by-product and a signal—a measure of power; and he is most happy who feels himself most free, and he is most free whose will is great enough to fight against the strongest enemies.

ON WILL AND VALUE

No people could live that did not *value*.

A table of values hangeth over each people; it is the voice of its will to power.

What enableth a people to dominate and conquer and shine, unto the terror and envy of its neighbour, that is regarded as the high, the first, the standard, the significance of things.

Valuing is creating. To value is the treasure and jewel among all things valued.

Values were only assigned unto things by man in order to maintain himself—he it was who gave significance to things,—a human significance.

Only by valuing is there value.

Change of values—*i.e.* change of creators.

. . .

At first people only were creators, and not till long afterwards, individuals; verily, the individual himself is the latest creation.

ON FREEDOM

Freedom is the will to be responsible
for oneself.

. . .
Thou art not free yet, thou seekest
freedom still.

. . .
Even he who is freed in spirit must
purify himself. Much of prison and mould
is left in him.

. . .
Not free *from* what, but free *for* what?

. . .
Art thou a new power and a new right?
A prime motor? A wheel self-rolling?

. . .
Canst thou give thyself thine evil and
thy good, hanging thy will above thee as
a law?

. . .
The mark of realised liberty? No longer
to feel shame before oneself.

How is freedom measured? By the resistance which has to be overcome; by the effort which it costs to retain superiority.

. . .

Liberal institutions cease to be liberal so soon as they are attained.

. . .

Freedom which I do *not* mean. In such times as the present, it is an additional peril to be left to one's instincts . . . independence, free development, and *laissez-aller* are claimed the most vehemently precisely by those for whom no restraint *would be too severe*.

. . .

Whoever will be free must make himself free; freedom is no fairy's gift to fall into any man's lap.

. . .

The feeble ask for liberty; the strong ask for rule.

. . .

A minority only is capable of independence.

. . .

It is necessary to know how to preserve oneself,—best proof of independence.

ON WILL AND WILLING

What is the Great Dragon which the spirit is no longer willing to call Lord and God? "Thou shalt." But the lion's spirit saith "I will."

. . .
All that feeleth within me suffereth and is in prison; but my willing always approacheth me as my liberator and bringer of joy.

. . .
Willing delivereth; that is the true doctrine of will and freedom.

. . .
My will unto power walketh on the feet of thy will unto truth.

. . .
He who would create beyond himself hath in mine eyes the purest will.

. . .
All "It was" is a fragment, a riddle, a

dismal accident, until a creating will saith unto it : " Thus I would have it."

Will is unable to will anything in the past. That time does not go backwards, that is will's wrath.

Will itself is still a prisoner—of " It was."

To save the past ones and to change every " It was " into a " Thus I would have it "—that alone for me would mean salvation.

Oh, that ye would renounce that half-willing and resolve upon idleness as one resolveth upon action !

O will, thou *my* necessity ! Reserve me for one great victory.

Nothing more agreeable groweth on earth than a high, strong will.

Purpose is the equilibration of instincts.

It is not the force but the duration of great sentiments that makes superior men.

There is no will, feeble or otherwise. Feeble will is oscillation and the loss of equilibrium; strong will is the orientation of instincts.

VALUING AND CREATING

Verily, a monster is this power of praising and blaming.

. . . .

What ye call world lieth still to be created by you.

. . . .

A creator is he who createth man's goal and giveth earth its significance and future.

. . . .

As a poet, solver of riddles and redeemer of chance, I taught them to work at the future and to redeem all that *hath been* by creating.

. . . .

Lo, the good and just ! Whom do they hate most ? Him who breaketh to pieces their tables of value . . . but he is the creator.

Such as will be creators with him the creator seeketh, those who write new values on new tables.

. . .

The world revolveth round the inventors of new values ; but the folk revolve round actors.

. . .

Truth is not to be discovered but created.

SUPERMAN

THE reflection in Metchnikoff's phrase that "man is a miscarriage of the ape," leads to the future reflection that man may be doomed to extinction as one of nature's failures and freaks. Our inveterate anthropocentricity alone conceals from us a fact that must be palpable enough to superior intelligences,—the fact, namely, that as a species of being, man is absurdly or pathetically inadequate to the tasks of the planet. When the place and importance of this globe are considered in relation to the solar system, and the solar system again in relation to the Milky Way, a momentary flash comes to man of his comparative insignificance. But in reality that flash is a false light ; for man has no need to bemoan his neglect of impossible and remote tasks, but only his failure to per-

form the near and possible. Eighteen millions of human years have left our earth in little better state than it was found. It is true that man has increased and multiplied and overrun the earth, but wherever he has gone he has taken with him his diseases and his ill humours as well as his better qualities.

It is very doubtful whether man after all these years is better constituted, more capable of happiness and health, or better equipped for the future, than man of ages and ages ago. Is there a single race, a single nation, to whom a planetary intelligence dare hand over the government of the earth? Not to speak of the natural products of the earth, those in which, fortunately, man has no share; nor the race of animals, whose treatment at man's hands is eloquent enough of what man could do; is there even a race to whom any wise human legislator dare commit the human destinies of the globe? We talk of Imperialism, but what nation is fit for it, still less for the comparatively simple political task of creating a universal com-

monwealth? Not a nation living is sufficiently superior to the rest to have its claim to universal power more than mockingly postulated. Pretentious and arrogant, or complacent and incompetent,—that is the general attitude of the most ambitious nations of to-day.

In the absence of anything like a universal human task, or even the beginnings of a political consideration of the view, it is almost idle to talk of tasks for humanity; for the present division of the globe into races and nations, cross-sectioned into creeds and castes, makes the discussion of human purpose theoretic and premature. It is impossible that there should be a human purpose until there is a humanity capable of purpose; and such a humanity capable of purpose presupposes the suppression of all the petty idiosyncrasies that so far maintain the dismemberment and fragmentariness of man. In short, until man is created, no human end is possible. All we can expect is conflict of temporary caprices, calling themselves by big names, or, at best, here and there an attempt on

the part of some community to train itself for the remote conquest of the globe.

This last, in effect, is Nietzsche's intention. Recognising the depressing prematurity of any practical world-politics, he confined his positive propaganda to the endeavour to stir up some nation, or perhaps a federated Europe, to one of the preparatory tasks of a real world-politic, that of breeding from itself a race capable of beginning, at least, to take over, and become responsible for, the future of life on the planet.

This preparatory race, however, is not to be confused with Nietzsche's conception of Superman. The enormous periods over which human life has already stretched without seeing the creation of anything like a passably superior race, make it unlikely that the creation not merely of a superior race but of a different race, is near at hand. The truth is, that except for the most profound students of "mystical" psychology, the very conception of Superman is impossible. Of almost all the descriptions, delineations and adumbra-

tions which students of Nietzsche have attempted of the Superman, it is necessary to say that, from Nietzsche's own standpoint, they are travesties and caricatures. At best such descriptions apply only to the "noble" race, which is preparatory to Superman.

But let us examine briefly Nietzsche's own attempts to portray Superman. At the outset, it is to be remarked that his own attempt is almost equally a failure with all the rest. For his Zarathustra was confessedly a preacher of Superman only, and not Superman. Yet it is true that about Nietzsche's descriptions there does hang the large air of promise. There is a thrill and a quickening felt by the readers of his eloquent pages whenever Nietzsche touches the subject of Superman. He may not have made Superman visible even to our minds, but, at least, he brought the conception so near as to let us hear the rustle of his wings.

In the section on "The Three Metamorphoses of the Spirit," Nietzsche names allegorically the phases of inner revolution

through which man passes on his way to Superman. They are represented in his mythology as the Camel, the Lion and the Child. Now, it is to be noted that all three are phases which lie for most people in the remote future ; for even the Camel phase is, in one sense, a characteristic of nobility. Metamorphoses of the spirit of man imply at least the existence of spirit ; and when it is remembered that in Nietzsche's view the multitude are devoid of spirit, that is, of that surplus of life manifesting as his will to power, it will be seen that the possibility of these three phases is confined to the comparatively few.

The camel phase of the spirit of man is marked by the will to power in its form of submission, service and duty. Camels are beasts of burden ; and the camel-soul wills to bear the burdens of men. For that task great power and great endurance are necessary, the will to serve in difficult tasks, the power to undertake heavy responsibilities, the spirit that allows itself to be worn out. Such men are the great legislators, public servants, splendid officials, whose law is

duty, whose aim is service, whose watchword is responsibility. The fact must not be disguised that this will to great service is one form of the will to power. By their "indispensability" they accomplish this will. They are least in order to be greatest. Nor must Nietzsche be supposed to under-rate their value. As a phase and a direction of the will to power, such men are the great preservers of life. They are in their totality the will to Power in its mode of Preserver.

But when the camel is loaded it goeth to the desert, and there it is transformed into a lion.

Be it remembered that Nietzsche is here concerned with revolutions in the spirit of man, and not necessarily of the individual. It seldom happens that a spirit is reborn twice or even once. But the psychology of the myth is discernible. For it is observable on the small scale that excess and surfeit of duty and conscious responsibility at last produce in the mind a reaction, which is equal and contrary. The preserver becomes the destroyer. Nothing is more tragical in the noble sense than the spectacle of the necessary relationship between preserva-

tion and destruction, whether in the individual or in the mind of man. All great destructive forces have resulted from the transformation of great preservative forces. That which maintains destroys so soon as it ceases to maintain, and not merely passively but actively. The time arrives sooner or later to every man of spirit, overburdened with conscious responsibility and charged with duty, to ask, Why should I bear this load? What would happen if I cast it aside? Gross dereliction of "duty" and ecstatic repudiation of responsibility are implied in this sudden frenzy, this birth-throe of a new spirit. Then the erstwhile camel becomes a lion, ravening and roaring in the solitary deserts, raging against all camels and camel burdens. For note that just as there is no enemy in the world so violent as love turned hatred, no partisan so implacable as he who has deserted his party, so there is no iconoclast so destructive as he who lately exerted himself to defend. In this second metamorphosis the will to power has the form of the will to destroy, and the will to de-

stroy the very thing that before it sought to preserve.

To this second phase of the will to power, Nietzsche conceived his preparatory race to belong. "Laughing lions," he names these philosophers of the great Perhaps. For in the largest sense the conflict in Europe at this moment is almost wholly marked by destruction. The great European of to-day and the ideal of Western civilisation is in Nietzsche's view the camel-soul. To whatever country we turn, and into whatever department of human activity, it is the steadfast, duty-loving, work-accomplishing, serviceable man that is admired. Now while that type is necessary, Nietzsche would have us understand that it is a phase and a phase only. Yet the forces of conservation and the fact that this type of power appears almost identical with the popular will to live, makes it dangerously stable and threateningly autocratic. The ideal of the statesman, the philosopher, the scientist and artist, as servants merely, even servants of a whole people, while secretly satisfy-

ing the desire for power of these individuals, constitutes a check and barrier to the appearance of another type of power. Every bureaucracy, even the most able and efficient, tends naturally to exclude and destroy originality and genius; and in the racial sense, an exclusive devotion to ideals of efficiency, service and duty, delays the very metamorphosis to which they lead.

Thus in special application to modern Europe, it is the race of lions that is now necessary to progress; individuals in whom, temporarily, at least, the will to power is in direct antagonism with the preservative will; doers as well as preachers of the contrary ideals, individuals who should trample on duties, refuse services, dismiss responsibilities and aspire to a new mastery.

Not by any means, however, must it be supposed that such men are allowed to be lawless, indifferent, irresponsible and destructive in the personal sense. Personally, they will need the strength and courage of lions, the discipline and good spirits of beasts of prey. That is their

done with
8
yet

duty, responsibility and service, to maintain themselves and all their weapons of offence and defence trim and keen. If the watchword of the camel is Others, the watchword of lions is Ourselves. By a rebound, as it were, the call and authority of the external world, so manifest in the minds of the nobly dutiful, are impelled into the innermost recesses of the individual ego. Such a being feels in himself the demand for duties and responsibilities, greater than ever he bore as camel, but also different, and appearing as the repudiation of camel duties and loads. That, in fact, is the exterior sign of the metamorphosis, the conscious realisation of a master within, and of the necessity of self service.

Few men in Europe, unfortunately, have reached this stage, and few therefore are available as the nucleus of Nietzsche's race of philosophers, who should prepare the way of Superman. Yet few as they are, their influence is already being felt. Nietzsche was himself one of his own "laughing lions." Every decade will see

more Nietzsches, more adventurous iconoclasts, mockers, destroyers ; and round them will fall the old ideals of duty and service, and so in time Europe may be delivered from the tyranny of a phase of spirit.

But the third metamorphosis is that of the child. This is indeed the Superman. For in him is no human consciousness of within and without, no conscious responsibility or rejection of responsibility, no will to serve or will to command. All in him is instinctive. He rules because he is ; his service is his presence ; his duty is to be.

Mark how, in effect, the whole institutions of love, marriage and home move round about the cradle of a child. Kings from the East and shepherds from the hills do indeed bring presents to every child that is born. For the sake of the child, civilisation itself has been created. The world circles about the new-born and about childhood. This in an economic sense. But that homage is not demanded, not enforced, not even willed or recognised. Who so imperial as a baby, yet who so

devotedly served? But let that pink unconscious body be replaced by a new mode of will, by a racially new human child, born of the miraculous union of humanity and the still uncreate world-will,—see in imagination a Europe become aware of the birth and presence of a god-child in its midst. All the mythology of the gods is a record or an anticipation of what human men have felt or may feel in the presence of such a being. Around him life itself will blossom as by its own strength. Sun he will be to all that come near him. Rain and dew distil from him.

Doubtless the picture may be felt to be overdrawn; but Nietzsche was a poet as well as a philosopher, a psalmist as well as a prophet. Iconoclastic and violent he may be like his own lions, yet he foresaw his own surpassing and the surpassing of his type in that image of the Superman, “the child in whom wisdom is become instinctive.” By such a type, the tedious human millennia would at least be justified; and the “mis-carriage of the ape” be redeemed. Towards the creation of such a type, every means

is justified, that brings him nearer. For he alone, no doubt of it, would include within himself all human progress, he, the great synthetic creature, the gatherer of fragments, and the healer, i.e., whole-maker—of men. If Nietzsche had done no more than lift up men's eyes to the hills whence may come the justification of the human drama, he would have deserved well of the race. But he did more. He took the first steps towards creating the creators of that type of man.

THE SUPERMAN

Who must come one day and will not be allowed to pass by? Our great Hazar, our far-off kingdom of man, the Zarathustra-kingdom of a thousand years.

Not "How is man preserved?" but "How is man surpassed?"

Superman is my care; with me *he* and not *man* is the first and only thing.

Who would not a hundred times sooner fear—if at the same time he might admire—than have nothing to fear, but, at the same time, to be unable to rid himself of the loathsome sight of the ill-constituted, the stunted, the stunted and the poisoned?

At some time, and in a stronger time than this tottering, self-doubting age of

ours, he *is* to come, the redeeming man of the great love and great contempt, the creative spirit, who, by his thronging power, is ever again driven away from every corner and other world.

The problem . . . is what type of man we are to *cultivate*, we are to *will*, as the more valuable, the more worthy of life, the more certain of the future.

A thousand goals have existed hitherto, for a thousand peoples existed ; but the one goal is lacking. And if the goal be lacking, is not humanity lacking ?

To Women : Let your hope be called, "Would that I might give birth to Superman."

Ye lonely ones of to-day, ye who stand apart, ye shall one day be a people.

Dead are all gods ; now we will that Superman live.

What could be created if there were gods ?

Never yet Superman existed. . . .
Verily, even the greatest one I found to
be—all too human !

. . . .

This is the secret of the soul. Not until the hero has left it, is it approached in dream by—super-hero.

. . . .

But from time to time permit me—assuming that there are heavenly patronesses beyond Good and Evil—a glance, permit me but *one* glance upon something perfect, something completely finished, something happy, mighty, triumphant, in which there is still something to be feared ! Upon a man that justifies *man* !

. . . .

Napoleon, this synthesis of monster and Superman.

. . .

I teach you Superman. . . . Superman is the significance of earth.

. . . .

Man is a rope connecting animal and Superman,—a rope across a precipice.

. . . .

I love him who worketh and inventeth

to build a house for Superman and make ready for him earth, animal and plant.

It is time for man to mark out his goal, to plant the germ of his highest hopes. His soil is still rich enough for that purpose.

NEW COMMANDMENTS

THE work that occupied the last years of Nietzsche's conscious life was to comprehend in a single treatise a criticism, analysis and reconstruction of European civilisation. What was needed, he thought, was a radical and ruthless revision of every valuation hitherto accepted. There was necessary a great European stocktaking. It seemed amazing that in spite of the enormous developments of science, the old, uncritical estimates should be accepted; and that for two thousand years Europe had made no courageous attempt to revise its valuations. Everywhere he saw men and institutions losing their original strength. Everywhere the means were becoming substitutes for ends. Against such a decadence it was incumbent

to fight positively, if the disease were to be checked. Eradicated it could never be, since decadence is one of the eternal modes of life. But amongst the more aristocratically-minded nations and individuals, it should surely be possible to discover a little band of trained, severe and bold thinkers, who should undertake the salvation of their own type, and the cause of vital power in Europe.

But some definite agreement amongst them was indispensable. Difficult as it notoriously is to make "two rams drink out of the same calabash," or two philosophers agree, yet in essence and in spirit, in their "friendship among the stars," as Nietzsche phrases it, they might agree. At any rate, there were a number of simple propositions which he would formulate as a rough criterion of admission into this select order. In their application, the individuals would act individually; but as an aristocratic caste their interests would on the whole be the same. Primarily, the proof of aristocracy is belief in one's own power. Power as the test of life and real-

ity is the aristocratic standard. Things are not to be measured by their vulgar standards of happiness, or goodness, or knowledge, or beauty. These are for the aristocrat mere by-products. The one element that determines value is power, power in the individual, power in events, power in things.

Granted that this test of reality is accepted by our philosophers, it is desirable that they should undertake a re-valuation of all European institutions in the light of that end. Remembering that for two thousand years dominant values had been popular values, the difficulty as well as the need of aristocratic values was enormous : for such re-valuations would have to oppose the whole stream of thought for centuries, and transcend the spirit of the age.

But this gigantic task Nietzsche by himself was powerless more than to begin in outline. It is indeed astonishing that a single man should have done so much as he did. Passing under review the chief institutions of Europe, religion, morality,

art, science, literature, politics, democracy, marriage, he attempted to discriminate in each of them the elements good for his aristocratic type, and to warn his coming race of laughing lions of the dangers involved in each of the popular assumptions.

But the more he pursued his task, the more difficult he found it, and the more imperative became his need for personal assistance. Over and over again he cries out for men to help him. Here, in effect he says, is a continent, the most promising the world has seen, with its noblest individuals scattered powerlessly and grinding corn in the mills of the Philistines ! Who will help me to "call them together, to give them new hopes, and to deliver them at last out of the house of bondage, and from the slave land of Egypt ?"

Such language, indeed, was not too sublime for Nietzsche to employ. His passion to re-create an aristocracy in Europe was comparable to the consuming zeal of a delivering Moses. Yet the more he observed his professed disciples, the more disappointed he became with them. Wag-

ner had failed him, and in Wagner's place there came now hosts of declamatory and effervescent "free-thinkers," calling themselves aristocrats and Dionysians and Nietzscheans. In these Nietzsche recognised his antipodes, his deadliest enemies.

It is indeed an irony of the tragic drama that a man's disciples are almost invariably his worst friends. They vulgarise, misconceive and finally invert the whole of their master's doctrines. It was in vain that Nietzsche fulminated against his "followers," and complained that he had no single disciple, that there was no one in Europe who comprehended him. It was in vain that he separated from himself the modern Dionysians of Germany, America and France. By a kind of malevolent instinct, they swarmed in where he had swept and garnished, and during Nietzsche's life, and ever since, they have done their best to warp his doctrines.

Nietzsche was led, however, to define his "philosophers" with more and more exactitude. Knowing as no other knew, the immense difficulties of the task pro-

posed, he piled up the qualities needed until they seemed to amount to superhuman power. Yet, in fact, they were only preliminary to the work of creating superman.

Immense power and immense discipline, these were, in short, the needs of the day. If an European aristocracy was to be created it would be only by means of men and women of the richest natures devoting themselves whole-heartedly to the task. Every institution in Europe at this moment is a menace and a peril to the aristocrat. Every institution is designed to fulfil the needs of the many, is in fact, a rampart against the few. It was necessary, therefore, for the all too few whole-minded of Europe to beware of every institution, to challenge every accepted dogma, to walk warily wherever the multitude trod.

But this perpetual watchfulness demanded a strength of purpose and a will like adamant. There was no room for weakness. Individually, such reformers should be capable of endurance and solitude. Since they alone were responsible for the future

of nobility in Europe, it was their "duty" to maintain their power always at its highest. Theirs was to be the warrior's ideal. Everything that increased their power would be permitted them ; everything that decreased it would be forbidden. Popular permissions and popular restrictions were to be of no value to them, being as they were, only the watchwords of the many, who were their enemies. Conformity to popular usages was entirely a matter of expediency. But nonconformity to their own standard of good and bad was transgression in the highest degree.

It will be seen by the discriminating that Nietzsche in thus bidding his renaissance aristocrats to ignore morality in favour of their own individual needs was, in reality, allotting them a difficult task, and one that from the moral point of view is often commended. Yet the distinction must be insisted upon that an individually determined adjustment of means to ends is contrary to the very spirit of popular morality, however externally it may appear to be high morality. For the aristocrat in determining

his own mode of life specifically repudiates any universal value in it. He not only does not accept the common mode of life, but he has no desire to make his own mode common. That, in fact, is the distinction between the aristocrat and the demagogue turned tyrant. The mark of the plebeian raised to power is that he desires his values to become universal. He desires all men to say, do, think and feel as he says, does, thinks and feels. But the true aristocrat desires that all men shall be like himself free, self-ruling, self-choosing. But this reticence and self-denial are also difficult to maintain in the face of popular sophistry. Nietzsche, however, makes it clear that war against popular sophistry is the normal condition of the aristocrat. To develop individual power there is needed a long purpose and a great resistance ; and what resistance can be greater than that offered by the multitude ? Hence, in one sense, the multitude with their gods are indispensable to the creation of the powerful man. As a sort of battlefield and place of exercise, the populace serve the needs of the aristocrat.

But for himself, his own virtues must be received in his own terms. Good is what makes him stronger, more productive. Bad is what enfeebles him.

The problem in Nietzsche's mind, we have seen, was the creation of an European aristocracy. The conditions of that aristocracy have also been laid down. But what, it may be asked, was the great emotion on which Nietzsche relied for the impulse, necessary to arouse and maintain such a purpose? That of love for the Superman. The Superman, in short, was Nietzsche's device for arousing the latent aristocratic desires of Europe. Round that flag, he thought, all the noble of the lands would gradually assemble. If the vision of the suffering Christ had been of such potency as to attract to itself the plebeianism of a whole race and maintain its interest for scores of generations, was it not possible to create a vision of a triumphant Christ (for that, in effect was Nietzsche's Dionysus), which should federate the noblest minds of Europe? Not a Christ upon the Cross, with the profound appeal

to the afflicted, the weary, the many ; but a Spirit of Joy and Triumph incarnate upon the earth, with an even profounder appeal to the happy, the well-constituted, the noble ! And if on behalf of the Cross creatures had transformed themselves from beasts to men, why should not men, on behalf of the radiant Dionysus, transform themselves from men to Supermen, becoming Dionysified, as the old Greeks said, even as many had desired to become one with Christ ?

And if the "Nietzscheans," who repudiated religion, not understanding that their master never did, should arise and declare that the phrasing was religious, Nietzsche would reply that only the noblest ideals would ever move the noblest wills to action, and religion is simply man's name for his noblest ideals. Hence to become Dionysified, identified with the spirit of joy, nobility, happiness and increasing life, was the religion of the aristocratic. Among them, when their caste was created in Europe, would be bred a new nobility, a more promising nobility than

Europe or the world had ever seen. The noble civilisations of the past had had their day. Defect was immanent in them from the first ; their decay was inevitable. But here in Europe a new attempt might be made. Centuries of Christian discipline had created at last a type of nobility even in the multitude. Against the populace in Europe, a harder, severer, more splendid and courageous type of nobility would be needed. It was comparatively easy to maintain superiority in Greece over a populace of slaves ; but over a populace politically free, superiority was more difficult. Hence an aristocracy in Europe would of necessity be a more powerful aristocracy than that of Greece or Rome. The greater the people the greater the nobles. To create this race, this noble caste, by resistance against the populace, was therefore the great political need to which the noble few should devote themselves.

And, in the end, they would save not only themselves but the many also. For the many have need of a justifying caste. Their very morality is real only in proportion as

it is made necessary by the strong. Conflict, struggle, and the dramatic antagonism of forces, being the very nature of life, democracy, or the many must decay and perish unless aristocracy and the few are revived and strengthened.

NEW COMMANDMENTS

What is the best, shall rule ; what is best, *will* rule.

Be every truth called false with which no laughter was mingled.

I strive not for my happiness ; I strive for my work.

Become what thou art.

Rather know nothing than know many things by halves.

To live as I like or to live not at all.

Will nothing beyond your capacity.

He who cannot lie knoweth not what truth is.

Be not virtuous beyond your ability.

And demand nothing from yourselves contrary to probability.

. . .

The noble one maketh it his law never to make anyone ashamed.

. . .

It is better to act wickedly than to think pettily.

. . .

Do I counsel you to slay your senses ?
I counsel the innocence of the senses.

. . .

If ye have an enemy return not good for evil, for that would make him ashamed.

. . .

Arise ! invent that justice which acquitteth everybody except the judge !

. . .

When ye had not yet sought yourselves ye found me. Now I ask you to lose me and find yourselves.

. . .

Let this be for you will unto truth, that all be turned into something conceivable, visible, tangible for men.

. . .

Myself I sacrifice unto my love, and my neighbour as myself.

Mistrust all in whom the impulse to punish is powerful.

. . .

He who is not a bird shall not dwell over abysses.

. . .

Everything evil I expect from thee ; therefore I demand from thee what is good.

. . .

Be sure to do whatever you like—but first be such as *can will*.

. . .

Be sure to love your neighbour as yourselves—but first of all be such as *love themselves*.

. . .

A right thou canst take as a prey thou shalt not allow to be given.

. . .

One shall not wish to enjoy oneself where one doth not give enjoyment. And one shall not *wish* to enjoy oneself.

. . .

Not whence ye come but whither ye go be your honour in future.

. . .

What is falling already, shall be struck down.

And him whom ye do not teach to fly,
teach—how to *fall quicker* !

The noblest only is perfectly hard. Be-
come hard.

Equality to the equal, inequality to the
unequal.

Nothing prohibited—except weakness.

Where one can love no longer, one shall
—*pass* !

Save me from all small victories.

Fear a man who hates himself.

I teach you not the neighbour but the
friend.

Arise ! invent that love which not only
beareth all punishment, but all guilt as well.

My great love unto the most remote
commandeth : Spare not thy neighbour.

What thou dost no one can do unto thee.

Whoever cannot command himself shall
obey.

Beware of all enchained intellects.

. . .

Practise, practise, and again practise. Be sure that faith will be added unto you.

. . .

In slaying, ye judges, take care to justify life itself. "Enemy" ye shall say, but not "wicked one"; "fool," but not "sinner."

. . .

With this counsel I counsel kings and churches and all that are weak from old age and virtue: allow yourselves to be subverted; in order that ye may recover life, and that virtue may recover you.

. . .

I teach men to say No to all that enfeeble; and to say Yes to all that fortifies and gives the sense of power.

. . .

Demand first what one *can* do; afterwards, what one *ought*.

. . .

Remain faithful to earth.

. . .

A new will I teach men; to will that way which man hath gone blindly and to call it good, and no longer to shirk aside from it like the sickly and dying.

Let thy virtue be too high for the familiarity of names.

. . . .

Write with blood, and thou wilt learn that blood is spirit.

. . . .

Throw not away the hero in thy soul.

. . . .

Ye are not great enough not to know hatred and envy. Then be great enough not to be ashamed of them.

. . . .

If your thought be conquered, your honesty shall shout victory over it.

. . . .

Let your work be a fight, your peace a victory.

. . . .

Ye are permitted to have enemies only who are to be hated ; not enemies who are to be despised.

APHORISMS

By one's own pain one's own knowledge increaseth.

. . .

Everything that suffereth wanteth to live in order to become ripe and gay and longing.

. . .

Eternity of *all* things is sought by all delight.

. . .

Chronic intellectual irritability is, if not genius, at least the mother of all genius.

. . .

Let us not think so much of punishing, blaming or improving people. Let us endeavour rather that our influence over the future be greater than theirs.

. . .

Success is always the greatest liar.

Rank is almost determinable by the degree of suffering a man can bear.

A man must do very much for himself in order to do anything at all for others.

What matters a book that cannot transport us beyond all books?

What we do is never understood, but only praised or blamed.

You idolise, you idealise, you perceive, and are unhappy.

Sects born to be weak hunt after a few intelligent adherents.

A fixed reputation is Society's guarantee that a man is reliable.

When we begin to understand, we grow polite, happy, ingenious.

Higher education and great numbers—that is a contradiction in terms.

The English are the people of consummate *cant*.

Men must require strength ; otherwise,
they never attain it.

One is pregnant only of one's own
child.

The higher its kin is the seldomer
doth a thing succeed.

All good things laugh.

One dances on one's own road.

The Greeks were superficial — from
profundity.

To flee *ennui* by any means is no less
vulgar than to work at anything.

The cure for imaginary sorrow is real
sorrow.

A bad conscience is often more endur-
able than a bad reputation.

Noble extraction has this advantage,
it makes poverty more endurable.

Punishment is more defiling than
crime.

The liberality of the rich is only a species of timidity.

. . .

Only where there are graves are there resurrections.

. . .

He is commanded who cannot obey his own self.

. . .

To command is more difficult than to obey.

. . .

He who doth not believe in himself lieth ever.

. . .

The greatest events are not our loudest but our stillest hours.

. . .

Not the height, the declivity is the terrible thing.

. . .

Of all treasure-pits one's own is digged out last.

. . .

Whoever obeyeth heareth not himself.

. . .

To give well is an *art* and the last and cunningest master-art of kindness.

. . .

Nothing is true, everything is lawful.

Only he who knoweth whither he sail-
eth knoweth also what wind is good, and
what is his fair wind.

. . . .
To demand of strength that it should
not manifest itself as strength . . . is ab-
surd.

. . . .
Only that which has no history is de-
finable.

. . . .
Courage desireth to laugh.

. . . .
A good war halloweth every cause.

. . . .
He who possesseth little is possessed
still less.

. . . .
Cowards are prudent.

. . . .
Whatever we recognise in a man, we
in flame in him.

. . . .
A small revenge is more human than no
revenge at all.

. . . .
Since man came into existence he hath
had too little joy. That alone is our original
sin.

All great love is lifted above all its pity, for it seeketh to create what it loveth.

. . . .

Ye have slain the visions of my youth.

. . . .

One refutes a thing by laying it respectfully on ice.

. . . .

The party-man becomes a liar by necessity.

. . . .

The inequality of rights is the very condition of there being rights at all.

. . . .

For the mediocre, it is a happiness to be mediocre.

. . . .

One must have chaos within to enable one to give birth to a dancing star.

. . . .

What to-day calleth itself a people deserveth no kings.

. . . .

That which requires to be proved is little worth.

. . . .

All mind finally becomes visible.

To do great things is hard, but to command great things is still harder.

. . .
The way—existeth not !

. . .
Mob at the top, mob below ! What are to-day “ poor ” and “ rich.”

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